Highlights
- Analysis reveals US missile and space systems critically dependent on minerals imported from geopolitical rivals like China
- Direct-ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) weapons require rare minerals, exposing significant supply chain vulnerabilities
- Proposed solutions include:
- Creating a new US mineral stockpile
- Securing long-term mineral contracts
- Incentivizing domestic production
Rare Earth Exchanges reviews Wischer, Autry & Bazilian’s Analysis of Direct-Ascent Antisatellite Weapons and Mineral Supply Chains
Source: Wischer, Autry & Bazilian, Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower, Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 2024 (opens in a new tab).
The authors present a compelling analysis of the strategic role of direct-ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) weapons and the crucial mineral supply chains supporting US space assets. The authors argue that in a potential US-China conflict, DA-ASAT weapons could serve as a decisive countermeasure against Chinese military satellites, disrupting China’s missile targeting and command-and-control operations.
While the US previously demonstrated the capability to destroy satellites with direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapons, Vice President Kamala Harris announced in April 2022 that the US would ban destructive DA-ASAT missile testing, seeking to establish this as a new international norm for responsible behavior in space. However is to change (opens in a new tab) under the Trump administration.
The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)—a key component of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system (opens in a new tab)—has demonstrated DA-ASAT capability, along with other missile defense systems like Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD (opens in a new tab)) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). (opens in a new tab)
The Critical Mineral Connection
A major takeaway from the analysis is the heavy reliance of these advanced missile systems on critical minerals, many of which the United States imports—often from geopolitical rivals like China, not surprisingly to the Rare Earth Exchanges reader.
The SM-3 missile, for instance, depends on rhenium, molybdenum, titanium, and natural graphite, with the latter being 100% imported—primarily from China. The authors warn that in a military buildup or a high-intensity conflict, Chinese mineral export controls or disruptions to shipping lanes could cripple US missile production.
Other Dependencies
Beyond DA-ASAT systems, the article also examines the broader mineral dependencies of US space assets, particularly rocket bodies. These structures, essential for launching satellites and counter-space weapons, require high-performance alloys incorporating hafnium, niobium, and nickel, among other critical minerals.
While Brazil dominates global niobium production, Chinese firms hold significant stakes in Brazilian mining operations, further exposing the US to Chinese leverage over mineral supply chains. While the USA has significant influence in Brazil, so does China, and of course Brazil is part of the BRICS block of nations.
Last year’s analysis highlights that only two US companies produce hafnium, (opens in a new tab) with some imports still coming from China and Russia, making supply vulnerabilities particularly acute.
Further Mineral and Element Dependence
The article extends its argument by detailing the broader strategic risks of mineral dependence. The US aerospace industry has historically been tied to Russian titanium, a situation that has persisted despite rising geopolitical tensions. Meanwhile, China’s global mineral dominance—backed by state-supported investments in mining and refining operations worldwide—allows Beijing to exert immense influence over global supply chains, a position further strengthened by its recent export controls on gallium, germanium, and graphite.
Possible Mitigation Measures
The authors propose several policy solutions to mitigate these risks. First, they advocate for a new US mineral stockpile dedicated to space assets, arguing that the current National Defense Stockpile (opens in a new tab) is too limited in scope and not designed for economic stabilization. Second, they call for concessional financing to enable US space companies to sign long-term, fixed-price mineral offtake agreements, which would stabilize prices and supply chains. Finally, they propose environmental and labor tariffs on minerals sourced from nations with lower regulatory standards, effectively incentivizing US companies to source minerals domestically or from allied nations.
Critical Review and Analysis
Wischer, Autry, and Bazilian deliver an insightful and strategically urgent examination of the intersection between space warfare, DA-ASAT capabilities, and the fragility of US mineral supply chains. Their analysis effectively underscores a fundamental contradiction in US defense strategy. While Washington seeks to counter Chinese military capabilities, it remains dangerously dependent on China for many of the materials needed to sustain its own space and missile programs. This resource paradox is the Achilles’ heel of US aerospace superiority.
The authors excel at connecting mineral supply chains to national security risks. Too often, discussions of US-China strategic competition focus narrowly on military hardware while ignoring the economic and industrial vulnerabilities that underpin that hardware. Those supply chains persist as a source of trouble for America.
By detailing the composition of DA-ASAT weapons and rocket bodies, they demonstrate that the US is not just competing against China in space but is also indirectly funding and reinforcing China’s mineral dominance. Think of that for a moment.
Their warnings about Chinese leverage over Brazilian niobium and Russia’s continued role in supplying US aerospace titanium are particularly astute, underscoring how supply chain vulnerabilities extend beyond direct US-China economic ties.
Some Missing Pieces
That said, the article could have gone further in exploring alternative mineral sources and industrial strategies. While the authors acknowledge US refining weaknesses, they do not deeply examine potential pathways for domestic production growth, and how innovation can help the U.S. leapfrog China.
The US has significant untapped rare earth and critical mineral reserves—notably in Alaska, California, and Wyoming—but bureaucratic red tape, environmental litigation, and investment hesitancy have stalled development—for all the reasons Rare Earth Exchanges reports on ad nauseum.
How About Some Solutions?
A more comprehensive analysis would have explored whether policy reforms, deregulation, or direct government investment could accelerate domestic mining and refining capacity. Furthermore, the article rightly identifies the importance of stockpiling but does not fully address the practical challenges of maintaining an effective strategic mineral reserve. Stockpiling is not just a matter of buying and storing metals; it requires a robust supply chain management strategy that prevents hoarding, price manipulation, or strategic inefficiencies. The comparison to China’s mineral stockpile is useful, but without a clear framework for stockpile governance, simply hoarding minerals will not automatically translate to supply chain resilience.
But Important Wisdom
One of the strongest aspects of the piece last year is its policy recommendations, particularly the proposal for concessional financing of long-term mineral contracts. The authors recognize that US space companies operate in a highly volatile market, where mineral price swings can severely impact costs.
By securing fixed-price contracts, companies could stabilize costs and reduce reliance on market fluctuations. Rare Earth Exchanges has suggested that President Trump visit China and negotiate a 5 to 10-year stabilization deal while resilience programs commence over the next handful of years. But this must be in addition to immediate resilience moves on this continent.
The authors do not sufficiently explore the geopolitical risks of relying on East Asian partners like Japan and South Korea, both of whom would be highly vulnerable in a US-China military confrontation, however. If Taiwan becomes a flashpoint, mineral supply routes from Japan and South Korea could be among the first disrupted, potentially rendering even well-structured mineral contracts useless. The authors should have considered alternative sourcing partnerships with nations like Canada, Australia and emerging mineral producers in Africa.
Additionally, the authors’ call for environmental and labor tariffs on imported minerals is a bold but politically contentious proposal. While well-intentioned, such tariffs could raise costs for US companies, potentially making domestic space production even less competitive. If tariffs are imposed without parallel subsidies or production incentives, they could drive companies to offshore even more production rather than encourage reshoring. A more effective strategy might be direct subsidies for US critical mineral projects, modeled after the CHIPS Act, which successfully incentivized domestic semiconductor production. But will these existing laws be tossed out by the Trump administration? What will they put up as an alternative?
Final Thoughts
Wischer, Autry, and Bazilian provide a timely and highly relevant analysis of the intersection between space warfare and mineral supply chain vulnerabilities. Their examination of DA-ASAT capabilities effectively highlights how mineral dependencies could shape the outcome of a US-China conflict, while their policy recommendations offer a general solid foundation for mitigating supply risks.
As Rare Earth Exchanges suggests herein, the article would have been stronger with a deeper analysis of domestic production strategies, supply chain resilience planning, and the risks of over-reliance on East Asian suppliers.
While the call for stockpiling and financing long-term contracts is sound, a more aggressive push for US mineral self-sufficiency—through subsidies, strategic partnerships, and refining investments—would be a more effective long-term solution. Rare Earth Exchanges notes that this implies the Trump administration back off on aggressive tariffs with traditional allies, among other actions.
In the final analysis, this piece is a wake-up call to the fragility of US space and defense capabilities in the face of mineral supply chain weaknesses. If Washington truly intends to compete with China in space, it must first break free from its reliance on Beijing’s minerals. Anything less is strategic self-sabotage and we’ll keep repeating that mantra, ad nauseam.
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