Highlights

• Myanmar functions as China's heavy rare earth pressure valve, supplying dysprosium/terbium-rich material critical for EV motors, with the Kachin Independence Army now acting as de facto gatekeeper for northern output.
• When conflict dynamics govern a supply node, price, continuity, and traceability become political variables rather than market variables, creating a midstream dependency stress test for rare earth supply chains.
• If the West wants magnets without Myanmar-linked risk, it must rapidly fund separation, metal-making, and magnet capacity while backing alternative HREE supply and accepting higher costs.

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Myanmar isn’t a footnote—it's the heavy rare earth pressure valve. Myanmar sits near the top of Rare Earth Exchanges’ heavy rare earth rankings, not because it runs a clean industrial machine, but because it supplies dysprosium/terbium-rich material into China’s midstream. Tobias Rossi’s essay in Illuminem argues (opens in a new tab) the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) now functions as a de facto gatekeeper for northern Myanmar’s heavy rare earth output—making Western “de-risking” rhetoric collide with battlefield realities.

What’s notable for investors

When a supply node is governed by conflict dynamics, price, continuity, and traceability become political variables—not market variables.

Sturdy foundations (generally consistent with known supply-chain mechanics):

• Myanmar’s heavy rare earth feedstock matters because dysprosium is used to stabilize NdFeB magnets for high-heat EV motor applications.
• The environmental critique tracks: Myanmar’s rare earth extraction has been widely associated with in-situ leaching, a method with significant groundwater and soil risks when poorly managed.
• The article’s broader thesis—China’s dominance is reinforced by midstream processing concentration—is directionally sound. Even “ex-China” ore often bottlenecks at the separation capacity.

Claims that may be accurate but should be treated as unverified unless sourced directly:

• KIA troop counts (“15,000”), precise seizure timelines (“late 2024”), and the revenue/tax schedule (e.g., “35,000 yuan/ton + 20% levy,” “>$200m annually”). These numbers may be plausible, but the essay does not show primary documentation.

Rhetoric vs reality: where the piece leans hard

Rossi writes with a strong moral frame (“planetary salvation,” “ESG fantasy,” “Beijing’s cold pragmatism”). That framing is compelling—but it can also over-conclude. The line “China deals with them because it chooses to” implies a neat, centralized control story. Real-world trade flows tend to be messier: multiple intermediaries, local power bargains, and cross-border enforcement gaps.

No obvious “gotcha” misinformation jumps out. The main risk is precision theater: confident figures and vivid imagery that may outpace verifiable data.

REEx takeaway: the Kachin supply chain is the stress test

Myanmar’s heavy rare earths are not just another upstream story. They are a midstream dependency stress test. If the West wants magnets without Myanmar-linked risk, it must fund separation, metal-making, and magnet capacity—fast—while backing alternative HREE supply (and accepting higher costs).

Source: Tobias Rossi, “Leaching sovereignty,” Illuminem Voices, Jan 19, 2026 (and sources cited therein).