Highlights

• Unregulated rare earth mining in Myanmar is controlled by ethnic militias.
• Severe environmental and health damage is occurring near the Thai border.
• Chinese firms and global demand are driving the mining boom.
• U.S. and EU companies are indirectly sourcing materials through complex supply chains.
• The mining process uses acid leaching, creating significant environmental risks.
• There is a regulatory void that threatens local communities and ecosystems.

A recent NPR report (opens in a new tab) rightly draws attention to the toxic environmental fallout from Myanmar’s unregulated rare earth mining near the Thai border. Residents report skin rashes, poisoned wells, and arsenic contamination in the Kok, Sai, and even the Mekong River. The culprit, the report claims, is an unchecked boom in rare earth mining under the control of the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—a well-armed ethnic militia with a long record of illicit trade and de facto Chinese backing. NPR’s emotional tone and ground-level reporting capture the local devastation, but their analysis of upstream economic and geopolitical drivers is notably thin and occasionally misleading.

A reminder that the Myanmar Rebels are named as the top Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) heavy rare earth element project via the project/rankings database.  Importantly, the ethnic armed organization Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has taken control of some of the most valuable mines for key rare earth minerals essential for manufacturing electric vehicles and other high-tech products. Recently, what appear to be members of the KIA communicated with REEx via the REEx Forum (opens in a new tab).  We reached out to the group for an interview. 

The NPR's central claim—that a spike in rare earth mining in Myanmar is triggering a “regional environmental disaster”—is broadly credible based on our knowledge of unfolding dynamics there. Multiple third-party sources, including satellite imagery, Chinese import data, and NGO reports, corroborate increased mining in Shan and Kachin states since 2015. NPR accurately connects China’s 2015 crackdown on domestic pollution to the offshoring of production into Myanmar. However, the article veers into vague insinuation by suggesting that the Chinese government is directly controlling these mines via the UWSA. In reality, while Chinese firms likely provided technical support and off-take agreements early on, Project Blue and others clarify that these are not state-owned operations. They are informal, loosely affiliated ventures that benefit China’s supply chain but operate beyond Beijing’s direct reach.

The piece is also short on economic context. Rare earths such as dysprosium, terbium, and neodymium—critical for magnets in electric vehicles and defense systems—are extracted from ion-adsorption clays using acid leaching. This method is cheap, efficient, and toxic. The environmental risks aren’t new or unique to Myanmar; China’s own southern provinces suffered similar devastation in the 1990s. What’s changed is that the geopolitical race for clean energy and defense supply chains has intensified—and the West, too, increasingly sources from this murky Myanmar corridor.

NPR fails to mention that U.S. and EU firms indirectly buy these materials through Chinese refiners.

The strongest part of the piece is its human lens. Testimonies from villagers, local officials, and activists like Niwat Roykaew ground the story in lived experience. But for Rare Earth Exchanges readers—especially retail investors—the key takeaway is this: Myanmar’s rare earth rush is a regulatory void, not a state-run scheme. It is enabled by global demand, informal power structures, and the world’s failure to build traceable, ethical alternatives.