Highlights

• China controls approximately 70% of rare earth mining and approximately 90% of processing capacity, creating a critical global supply chain vulnerability.
• U.S. Department of Defense has invested $400 million in MP Materials to develop domestic rare earth magnet production capacity.
• Achieving U.S. rare earth self-sufficiency by 2030 requires comprehensive industrial policy, workforce training, and international partnerships.

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The CNBC recent “Rare Earths Are China’s Trump Card In The Trade War — How The U.S. Is Trying To Fix That (opens in a new tab)” segment accurately frames the central truth of the current situation: China controls ~70% of rare earth mining and ~90% of processing capacity. The description of light vs. heavy rare earth extraction methods — hard rock blasting vs. ion-adsorption clays — aligns with established environmental and technical realities. U.S. dependency on China for both raw and processed rare earths, particularly neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) magnets, is not in dispute, nor is the fact that MP Materials runs the only operational U.S. mine at Mountain Pass.

The Department of Defense’s $400M investment in MP Materials, coupled with price floor guarantees (~$110/kg NdPr), is a verifiable and consequential move aimed at creating domestic magnet-making capacity. Energy Fuels’ use of monazite from Chemours’ Georgia sands and its handling of radioactivity at the White Mesa mill are also grounded in operational fact.

Where the Narrative Gets Fuzzy

The video leans into “existential competition” and “all hands on deck warfare” rhetoric — language that may overheat an otherwise sober supply chain discussion. While the claim that China’s April 2025 export controls shut down production at Suzuki and Ford is accurate—at least the Ford news we were able to verify—but the CNBC piece is presented without sourcing, making it hard to verify. Similarly, the suggestion that China assumed Tesla’s humanoid robot magnets would be for military use veers into speculation without documented evidence.

The assertion that U.S. mines could meet “50–100%” of domestic needs in 3–4 years feels optimistic given known permitting timelines, chemical reagent dependencies, and skilled labor shortages — all points the piece itself admits remain hurdles.  Rare Earth Exchanges suggests perhaps in five years (2030-2031), and with near flawless execution, maybe 50% could be reachable (here we assume with international partnerships).

The segment frames China as both a geopolitical adversary and a manipulator of global pricing, but offers a limited perspective on how U.S. or allied environmental, cost, or policy factors have contributed to current vulnerabilities.  After all, the USA used to be at the apex of magnet production once upon a time.  Plus, the absence of discussion on allied capacity-building (e.g., Lynas in Australia) narrows the scope to a U.S.-China binary.

Investor Takeaway

There is genuine momentum in U.S. rare earth capacity-building — MP’s magnet expansion, Energy Fuels’ diversification, recycling initiatives — but domestic self-sufficiency in magnets by 2030 is unlikely without parallel investment in reagents, metallurgical workforce training, and allied partnerships.  Essentially, a far more potent, integrated, and comprehensive industrial policy.  Much like President Trump did for Operation Warp Speed in response to the pandemic. 

The CNBC piece delivers valuable on-the-ground visuals and key data points. Still, investors should separate hard metrics from overly optimistic aspirations, and for that matter, geopolitical theater, and verify disruption claims before baking them into risk models.

Source: CNBC, “Inside America’s Race to Break China’s Rare Earth Monopoly,” (opens in a new tab) Aug. 2025.