Highlights

• China controls over 80% of global rare earth refining.
• China controls 90% of high-strength magnet production.
• U.S. rare earth deposits remain underdeveloped due to permitting challenges and inconsistent policy support.
• Proposed U.S.-Russia rare earth partnership is strategically risky, economically implausible, and politically unrealistic.

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In a provocative essay (opens in a new tab) published by The National Interest, author Brandon J. Weichert argues that the United States can only break free of China’s rare earth dominance through two strategies: rapidly building its domestic supply chain or—more controversially—cutting a resource development deal with Russia. According to Weichert, the fastest way to achieve this would be to end the Ukraine War and realign U.S. policy to embrace Russia as a commodities partner. Bold? Yes. Grounded in reality? Let’s dig in.

Note The National Interest (TNI) is an American bimonthly international relations magazine edited by American journalist Jacob Heilbrunn and published by the Center for the National Interest, a public policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., that was established by former U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1994 as the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. The magazine is associated with the realist school of international studies.

Where the Article Holds Up

Weichert correctly identifies several truths that Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) has reported:

• China dominates the global rare earths industry, controlling over 80% of global refining and >90% of high-strength magnet production.
• The U.S. does have substantial rare earth deposits, especially at sites like Mountain Pass, Round Top, and Bear Lodge, but they remain underdeveloped due to permitting bottlenecks and inconsistent policy support.
• Russia has rare earth reserves, particularly in regions like Murmansk and Krasnoyarsk, and has ambitions to grow its critical minerals sector. Its potential remains largely untapped, though some small-scale refining does exist.

Where the Logic Breaks Down

While the article is imaginative in scope, it leans on speculative geopolitics and ignores harsh economic and strategic realities:

• There is no evidence of a commercially viable U.S.-Russia REE supply agreement in the works. The reference to Kirill Dmitriev, a sanctioned Putin ally, proposing deals is anecdotal and not corroborated by U.S. agencies or independent media.
• Russia’s rare earth sector is embryonic—lacking advanced separation and magnet-making capacity. It would take years of capital and technology transfer to reach even modest production, assuming sanctions didn’t block such collaboration.
• Ending the Ukraine war will not suddenly unlock REE riches. Many of Ukraine’s known REE deposits lie in Russian-occupied territory, but Russia itself is years behind China and Australia in REE commercialization.

Ideology Over Industry

The essay also veers into political messaging disguised as mineral strategy. Blaming the Ukraine conflict for failures in U.S. trade leverage with China oversimplifies a complex economic and industrial imbalance that has taken decades to build. The piece barely mentions Australia, Canada, Norway, or African nations, all of which are more natural partners for U.S. REE cooperation.

REEx Bottom Line

Weichert’s core point—that the U.S. needs to break its dependence on China for rare earths—is valid and urgent. But the proposed shortcut via Moscow is strategically risky, economically implausible, and politically radioactive. A pivot to Russia is not a substitute for serious U.S. investment, regulatory reform, and alliances with existing partners in the ex-China rare earth space.