Highlights

• China controls over 70% of rare earth mining and refining, using these minerals as a strategic geopolitical weapon.
• Western nations are struggling to break free from China's rare earth monopoly through diversification efforts and new mining projects.
• The rare earth debate extends beyond mineral control to processing, market dynamics, and long-term geopolitical strategy.

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Rare earth elements (REEs) are at the center of a global geopolitical and economic struggle, and today, Singapore’s Straits Times captures the essence of their growing importance. The piece effectively highlights China’s dominance in rare earth mining and refining, the West’s efforts to diversify supply chains, and Trump’s renewed interest in securing access to critical minerals—including his controversial references to Greenland and Ukraine. However, while the article presents a broad overview of rare earths and their strategic importance, it overlooks key aspects of the geopolitical chessboard, misrepresents certain facts, and avoids deeper economic realities about the rare earth supply chain.

What did they get right from Singapore?

The article correctly emphasizes that rare earths are not geologically rare but are difficult to extract in economically viable concentrations. It also explains why refining and processing, not mining, is the true bottleneck—a critical point often lost in mainstream coverage. The piece acknowledges China’s long-standing control over the supply chain, noting that it accounts for about 70% of rare earth mining and an even higher percentage of refining capacity.

It correctly highlights China’s use of rare earths as a geopolitical weapon, particularly referencing its 2010 embargo against Japan and its more recent export restrictions on germanium and gallium.

Additionally, the article correctly frames the challenges facing Western nations in building independent rare earth supply chains. It discusses the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, the revival of the Mountain Pass mine in the U.S., and Brazil’s new Serra Verde project. These details provide a solid foundation for understanding the rare earth supply chain challenges and the West’s efforts to counter China’s grip on the industry.

 What’s Missing?

The article provides a broad overview of rare earths but fails to address the deeper economic and geopolitical realities that shape the industry. While it highlights Western efforts to break free from China’s dominance, it overlooks the immense financial and regulatory barriers that make rare earth independence so difficult. Unlike China, where state-backed enterprises control the sector, Western projects must contend with high costs, lengthy permitting, and environmental opposition. Without subsidies and long-term contracts, most non-Chinese rare earth ventures struggle to remain viable in a volatile market, often collapsing when Beijing manipulates prices to undercut competition.

The piece also misses China’s long-term strategy, particularly its strategic stockpiling of rare earths, which allows Beijing to weaponize supply disruptions while insulating its domestic industries. It also fails to mention China’s two rare earth bases, which represent monopolization of key value-added production in the supply chain.

It fails to explore China’s dual-use approach, where rare earths power not just green energy but also critical military technologies, from fighter jets to missile guidance systems.

Additionally, the article reduces Trump’s Greenland interest to a simplistic takeover attempt, ignoring the growing strategic importance of Arctic resources. It also debunks his claim about Ukraine’s rare earth reserves without explaining why Ukraine’s massive graphite and titanium deposits are crucial for battery and defense industries. However, as Rare Earth Exchanges has chronicled, these latter commodities are critical minerals.

The Singapore-based piece largely ignores Japan and South Korea, two of the biggest players in rare earth diversification, and fails to mention rising alternative suppliers like Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, and Canada. By missing these critical factors, the article presents an incomplete picture of the rare earth landscape, underestimating the complexity of supply chain shifts and geopolitical maneuvering shaping the industry’s future.

What does the Article Avoid?

The Straits Times piece carefully sidesteps some of the most sensitive issues surrounding rare earth, which include, first and foremost, China’s leverage over Western tech companies: Companies like Apple, Tesla, and General Motors remain heavily reliant on China’s rare earth supply chain, even as the U.S. government pushes for diversification. The article fails to explore corporations' hesitation to shift supply chains out of China.  Second is the role of illegal mining and environmental damage in China: While it mentions the ecological challenges of rare earth extraction, the piece does not address China’s past reliance on illegal mining operations, which have devastated ecosystems but kept costs low.  Finally, there is financial instability in non-Chinese rare earth ventures: Many non-Chinese rare earth companies collapse due to price manipulation by China, a strategy Beijing has used before. The article does not explore how China floods the market with cheap rare earths to drive competitors out before tightening supply again.

A MoreNuanced Rare Earths Debate

The Straits Times article offers a good overview of rare earths and their importance, but it stops short of fully unpacking the geopolitical, economic, and strategic complexities at play. While it correctly highlights China’s dominance and Western attempts to diversify supply chains, it misses key challenges that make rare earth independence difficult. The lack of discussion on stockpiling, corporate reliance on China, and Western financial hurdles leaves the reader with an incomplete picture.

Moving forward, the rare earth debate will not just be about who controls the minerals but also who controls the processing, the markets, and the long-term geopolitical strategy. As tensions between the U.S., China, and other major economies escalate, rare earth will continue to be a crucial economic weapon—one that is far more complex than a simple discussion of Greenland or Ukraine, as implied by President Trump.