Highlights

• U.S. policy accelerates deals: The White House signaled more “historic deals” with miners to secure critical minerals supply. A Korean firm announced a $7.4 billion U.S. refinery project backed by Washington, underscoring government financing’s pivotal role.
• North America’s supply chain advances: USA Rare Earth re-forecasted earlier than prior guidance (though will rely on imported feedstock initially). Tactical Resources won shareholder and court approval for a Nasdaq-listing SPAC merger. Energy Fuels achieved a heavy REE refining milestone, qualifying 99.9% dysprosium oxide from its Utah mill for magnet use – a first for U.S.-produced “heavy” rare earths.
• Global downstream moves: Europe's first magnet plant began producing at scale (Neo’s Estonia facility, ~2,000 t/yr) with supply contracts to major auto suppliers. This is phase 1 with more planned. Australia launched an open-access REE processing initiative for clay deposits and secured $1 billion+ in multi-national funding for a flagship project (Arafura’s Nolans).
• Emerging markets & alliances: Latin America continued to draw attention (e.g., EU interest in Chile’s ionic clays, new Brazilian project acquisitions). Saudi Arabia is aligning with U.S. partners to build a local REE supply chain. In Africa, U.S. officials engaged Malawi’s Kangankunde mine developer on offtake opportunities, following a U.S. grant to a neighboring project.
• China market shifts: Beijing has quietly eased export curbs – granting year-long licenses to magnet makers – and November exports jumped 13% after a U.S.-China trade truce. Nevertheless, price gaps are stark: dysprosium oxide is $900/kg in Rotterdam vs. ~$255/kg in China, pushing Western buyers into long-term offtakes and “security premium” pricing deals. NdPr oxide in China hovers around ¥600–700k/ton ($90–100/kg), its highest in two years, reflecting both renewed demand and lingering export controls. Note pricing is volatile in some cases, as well as country-specific in others.

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North America: Washington Moves From Subsidy to Ownership

At a Washington conference, White House energy advisor Jarrod Agen signaled a sharper U.S. posture: “control our own destiny” in critical minerals, including direct equity stakes in firms such as MP Materials and Lithium Americas, with more “historic partnerships” implied. That framing matters because it suggests Washington is no longer content to be a grant-maker—it wants governance leverage over delivery, timelines, and downstream capacity. Korea Zinc’s proposed $7.4B Tennessee refinery—backed by government financing and tied to defense-adjacent offtake chatter—fits the pattern: the U.S. is trying to rebuild refining as a strategic industry, not a commodity business.

But is Washington doing enough? Do they have a sufficient industrial policy in place? One that emphasizes a holistic, comprehensive, and enduring approach?

Even with President Donald Trump’s exceptional and consequential moves—equity stakes, emergency actions, tariffs, fast-tracked permits, and a willingness to treat critical minerals as a national security asset—the United States remains far from where it needs to be because these actions, while bold, are still episodic rather than systemic. They address projects, not the full industrial stack; transactions, not throughput; incentives, not permanence. The U.S. still lacks an end-to-end, time-sequenced industrial policy that synchronizes mining, separation, metal/alloying, magnet manufacturing, workforce development, environmental permitting, long-term offtake, and strategic stockpiling under a single durable framework that survives administrations.

Plus, heavy rare earths remain the most dangerous chokepoint, with no scaled domestic Dy/Tb supply; midstream capacity is fragile and project-specific; downstream magnet plants are arriving faster than feedstock; and allies are still being treated as supplements rather than integrated extensions of a coherent North American–Atlantic supply system.

In short, according to REEx, Trump has moved the board pieces decisively—but without locking in the rules of the game, the U.S. is still playing serious catch-up in a contest that rewards continuity, scale, and industrial patience, not just speed and deal-making.

USA Rare Earth: The Magnet Factory Arrives Before the Mine

USA Rare Earth’s timeline is both bold and revealing. The plan to produce sintered NdFeB magnets in Oklahoma by early 2026, while the Round Top mine comes later (late 2028), creates a two-year reality gap: “Made in USA” magnets made from imported feedstock. This is not failure; it is the reality of sequencing. But it undercuts any marketing that implies instantaneous supply sovereignty. The company’s acquisitions and alloy supply agreements may narrow risk, yet the central truth remains: downstream can be built faster than upstream, and the gap gets filled by foreign material until mining and separation catch up.

Energy Fuels: A U.S. Heavy-REE Milestone With Real Teeth

Energy Fuels’ update is the most materially significant midstream signal in this package. The company reports that 99.9% of % dysprosium oxide produced at White Mesa has been qualified for NdFeB magnet use after QA testing by a major South Korean manufacturer. Even at small quantities so far, qualification is the point: it converts “lab success” into “industrial permission.” If terbium oxide samples arrive in early 2026, the U.S. will begin to show a credible pathway for heavies—still the most dangerous chokepoint in the magnet chain.

Capital Markets: SPACs, Upgrades, and the Accountability Era

Tactical Resources’ SPAC (opens in a new tab) path toward a Nasdaq listing (Q1 2026 expected) reflects continuing investor appetite for non-China exposure, while MP Materials’ bullish research upgrades keep expectations climbing. The subtext: markets will fund the story, but Washington increasingly wants co-investment and oversight—a shift from writing checks to buying influence in supply-chain execution.

Canada: “Privilege, Not a Guarantee”

Canada’s posture hardens as USMCA renegotiation approaches. Mark Carney’s warning that U.S. access to Canadian critical minerals is “not guaranteed” reads like a negotiation primer: friendly, but not free. Domestically, “one project, one review” and Ontario’s C$500M processing fund (opens in a new tab) are designed to accelerate midstream build-out. The Saskatchewan facility’s offtake with REAlloys—cost-plus, multi-year, expansion funded—illustrates the new model: bankable contracts + capacity expansion + allied offtakers.

Europe: Industrial Awakening, Still Racing the Clock

Europe is assembling tools—ReSourceEU (opens in a new tab), possible mandates to diversify away from China, and tighter control of scrap exports—but still struggles with speed and scale versus the U.S. The brighter spot is tangible: Neo Performance Materials’ (opens in a new tab) magnet plant in Estonia is a real downstream foothold, paired with European customer contracts. Yet heavy-REE dependence remains the looming constraint; Europe’s alliances for Dy/Tb supply are less a strategy than a scramble to secure “the heavies” before factories scale.

Australia and Beyond: Infrastructure, Alliances, and the Long Build

Australia’s ANSTO open-access ionic clay processing plant is an unusually pragmatic move: shared infrastructure that reduces technical risk for juniors without forcing each to build a mini-refinery. Multilateral financing for projects like Arafura reinforces Australia’s role as the “friendly foundation” of ex-China supply—slow, capital-heavy, but increasingly coordinated with allies. Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa show the same theme: geology is plentiful, but bankable execution depends on permitting, processing know-how, and credibility offtake—and now, increasingly, state-backed capital.

On American magnets

The week before, we reported that Germany’s Vacuumschmelze (VAC) announced VACODYM 902 TP, an NdFeB magnet alloy marketed as “heavy rare earth-free,” positioning it as a potential way to reduce Europe’s reliance on Chinese-controlled dysprosium and terbium supply. The strategic logic is sound—China still dominates industrial-scale heavy rare earth production, and Western alternatives remain limited—but the performance claims remain unproven without published data on coercivity, thermal stability, and long-term durability in high-temperature applications such as EV motors and defense systems.

Historically, heavy rare-earth-free magnets have worked only within narrower operating windows, raising questions about whether VAC’s alloy can truly function as a drop-in replacement. As such, the announcement is best read as a strategically relevant signal rather than a solved problem: a reminder that alloy innovation may reduce heavy rare earth intensity, but it is unlikely to eliminate demand until scalable non-Chinese supply comes online later in the decade.

We also noted that other magnet makers were thriving in the United States. Key companies include Permag (opens in a new tab), Arnold Magnetic Technologies (opens in a new tab), as well as, importantly, Noveon Magnetics (opens in a new tab), the Texas-based manufacturer of high-performance sintered neodymium magnets, notable for its patented "Magnet-to-Magnet" recycling process that creates new magnets from old ones, reducing reliance on new rare earth mining and China's supply chain.