Highlights
- The U.S. Department of Defense aims to completely remove Chinese rare earth materials from weapon systems by 2027, targeting strategic independence from China’s near-monopoly on critical minerals.
- Chinese export controls and trade tensions are disrupting global rare earth supply chains, potentially impacting fighter jet production, missile systems, and advanced military technologies.
- Allies like Australia, Japan, and Europe are actively developing alternative rare earth mining and processing capabilities to support U.S. defense industrial base resilience.
Rare earth elements (REEs) are the unsung heroes behind many advanced military technologies. These 17 metals possess unique magnetic, luminescent, and strength properties essential for high-performance defense systems. U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) contractors like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon rely on rare earth magnets (especially neodymium-iron-boron, or NdFeB, and samarium-cobalt types) and other REE-based components in a wide array of applications. For example, an F-35 Lightning II fighter jet contains over 900 pounds of rare earth materials in its electronic systems, electric motors, and actuators. Naval platforms are even more demanding – an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer uses about 5,200 pounds of rare earths, and a Virginia-class attack submarine roughly 9,200 pounds. These materials are embedded in jet engines, missile guidance and precision weapons, radar and sonar systems, satellites, and communications.
Sourcing Rare Earths
For decades, DoD prime contractors and their suppliers have sourced rare earth materials through complex global supply chains – supply chains that often run through China. While the U.S. pioneered rare earth magnet technology and still designs systems like sintered NdFeB magnets domestically, China has come to dominate every step of the rare earth supply chain over the past 30 years. Today, China is the world’s largest miner, refiner, and magnet manufacturer for rare earths, accounting for about 90% of global rare earth production and an even higher share of processed rare earth oxides and metals.
According to numerous accounts, between 2020 and 2023, 70% of the rare earth elements imported to the U.S. came from China. Even allied sources ultimately depend on China—Australia’s Lynas Corp. is the largest rare-earth miner outside China, yet it has historically sent at least some of its concentrates to China for refining due to a lack of local processing capacity, as cited by CSIS (opens in a new tab).
For defense contractors, this monopoly means that many critical components are effectively single-sourced from China. A recent Reuters report (opens in a new tab) highlighted that certain rare earth materials for U.S. aerospace avionics are available only from Chinese suppliers, causing serious concern in the industry.
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies (RTX), Honeywell, and Boeing have all faced challenges tracing and securing non-Chinese sources for the rare earth magnets and alloys embedded in products like jet engines, sensors, and guidance units cites the Reuters (opens in a new tab) account.
In some cases, Chinese-origin content has slipped past oversight: in 2022, the Pentagon temporarily halted deliveries of new F-35 jets after discovering that a samarium-cobalt alloy in an F-35 turbomachine pump magnet was produced in China, violating federal acquisition rules (opens in a new tab). (The part, made by a Honeywell subcontractor, was deemed safe and eventually received a national security waiver (opens in a new tab) to keep F-35 production going.) This incident underscored how deeply Chinese rare earth materials are embedded in U.S. defense systems, often “hidden” in subcomponents sourced through complex contractor tiers.
Biden-Era Ban on Chinese Magnets by 2027
Concern over these dependencies led to bipartisan action during the Biden administration. In 2022, Congress and the White House began moving to ban Chinese-origin rare earth magnets and products in U.S. defense platforms. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2023 and FY2024 included provisions tightening restrictions on sourcing of magnets. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was updated to reflect a two-stage ban:
- Phase 1 (through 2026): Per Acquisition.gov, contractors cannot deliver any end item containing NdFeB or samarium-cobalt magnets melted or produced in China (or other adversarial countries like Russia, Iran, or North Korea). However, during this phase, magnets made elsewhere could use Chinese-origin feedstock. This gave the industry some time to adjust sourcing.
- Phase 2 (effective January 1, 2027): The restriction expands to cover the entire supply chain of these magnets. Contractors will be prohibited from delivering any end item containing an NdFeB or SmCo magnet if any stage of its production – from rare earth ore mining to refining, alloying, and magnet manufacturing – occurred in China or other covered countries.
In other words, by 2027, the DoD must completely purge Chinese rare earth content from its weapon systems. However, several industry experts REEx has spoken with mention that this will be nearly impossible to achieve.
This looming deadline signaled that defense suppliers must “de-Sinicize” their rare earth supply chains within a few years. The Biden administration also ramped up transparency requirements, requiring contractors to disclose the country of origin for any REE permanent magnets used in weapon systems. See General Accounting Office notice. In parallel, the Pentagon invested in domestic projects to close the gap (more on those efforts in a moment).
As of early 2025, this prohibition on Chinese magnets by 2027 remains on the books. The policy reflected a broad bipartisan consensus on reducing dependence on an adversary for mission-critical materials. But it also posed a daunting challenge: the U.S. had (and still has) no full-scale domestic rare earth magnet supply chain, and alternative suppliers are limited. The question heading into 2025 was whether the incoming administration would stay the course or adjust the timeline.
Trump’s Second Term: Policy Continuity or Change?
Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 has so far reinforced the push for rare earth supply chain security, albeit with his characteristic hardline twist. In some ways, on steroids, multiple executive orders are linked to critical minerals and rare earths.
The new administration has not reversed the 2027 Chinese magnet ban for defense systems – a move that would likely be unpopular in Congress – but it faces the reality that the clock is ticking. Trump officials have hinted at implementation flexibility if necessary to avoid grounding U.S. programs, but there is no formal change to the deadline. If anything, Trump’s team is doubling down on eliminating Chinese rare earths from defense platforms, framing it as part of a broader “economic decoupling” for national security.
Again, early into his second term, President Trump issued a flurry of executive actions targeting critical minerals supply chains and Chinese tradepractices:
- Executive Order on Domestic Minerals (March 20, 2025): President Trump signed an EO invoking emergency defense powers to boost domestic mining and processing of critical minerals, including rare earthscsis.org (opens in a new tab)csis.org (opens in a new tab). The order fast-tracks permits for mining projects on federal land, directs the Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III funds toward critical mineral processing facilities, and even taps the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. to fund mining ventures (an unusual use of an overseas development arm for domestic projects). It also established a new National Energy Dominance Council to oversee critical mineral development, signaling a top-priority status for rare earth independence. This EO aims to ensure the U.S. can meet the 2027 goal of an indigenous supply chain by empowering agencies to expedite mine-to-magnet projects. Notably, the Pentagon’s 2024 Defense Industrial Strategy had already set a goal to establish a complete “mine-to-magnet” REE supply chain able to meet all defense needs by 2027 – Trump’s directive puts political muscle behind that objective. (As we discuss below, whether the goal is achievable that fast is another matter.).
- On April 15, 2025, President Trump signed another executive order directing the Department of Commerce to initiate a Section 232 investigation into whether U.S. reliance on imported processed critical minerals and their derivative products threatens national security. Citing these materials’ foundational role in defense systems, advanced manufacturing, and key infrastructure, the order warns that concentrated foreign control—especially by adversarial nations—has created serious supply chain vulnerabilities, economic instability, and strategic risk. The investigation will assess global sourcing, pricing distortions, and foreign market manipulation, with potential outcomes including tariffs, import restrictions, and incentives to boost domestic production and recycling. This move signals a major escalation in U.S. industrial policy, linking critical mineral security directly to defense readiness and economic resilience
- Trade Measures – Tariffs and Investigations: The Trump administration resurrected and escalated the trade war with China. In early 2025, President Trump unveiled a “Reciprocal Trade” policy that slapped hefty tariffs on imports from nations running big trade surpluses with the U.S. China was hit hardest. By April 2025, Chinese imports faced combined tariffs reportedly exceeding 125%–145% in some categories – a mix of base tariffs, special tariffs (citing issues like fentanyl), and legacy Section 301 duties. Beijing’s retaliation specifically targeted America’s tech and defense Achilles heel: critical minerals. In an April 4 announcement, China suspended exports of several heavy rare earth metals and high-performance rare earth magnets vital to defense and high-tech industries. As cited above, just days later, on April 15, Trump responded with another Executive Order directing the Commerce Department to initiate a Section 232 national security investigation into imports of critical minerals and their downstream products. This investigation, akin to those that justified steel and aluminum tariffs in 2018, will evaluate the harm of foreign reliance and consider new import restrictions or tariffs on critical mineral products. The aim is twofold: pressure U.S. industry to source domestically and increase leverage against China. If Commerce finds that imports threaten national security, Trump could impose tariff-rate quotas or outright tariffs on non-allied sources of rare earth oxides, metals, and magnets. Any Section 232 measures would supersede the earlier “reciprocal” tariffs, potentially institutionalizing a long-term protective barrier around U.S. rare earth supply chains.
- Procurement Rule Changes and DPA Funding: The Trump Pentagon has indicated it will strictly enforce the coming 2027 magnet ban, but it also moved to help industry comply. In February 2025, the DoD expanded stockpiles of critical rare earth oxides and alloys and urged contractors to qualify non-Chinese sources before the deadline. Using Defense Production Act funding has accelerated, building on Biden-era investments, Trump’s defense officials in 2025 announced new DPA Title III awards to companies establishing rare earth magnet manufacturing on U.S. soil. For example, USA Rare Earth received additional funding to complete a sintered NdFeB magnet plant in Oklahoma (a project initially backed by DOD in 2020). Similarly, MP Materials – owner of America’s sole rare earth mine in Mountain Pass, CA – is being supported through the final steps of developing domestic refining and magnet-making capacity. These efforts started under the prior administration but are being touted by Trump as evidence that the U.S. will be ready to break free from Chinese magnets on schedule.
So far, none of President Trump’s actions suggests a loosening of the Biden-era restriction on Chinese rare earth content; if anything, his confrontational approach with Beijing reinforces the logic behind it.
However, Trump’s aggressive trade posture has provoked a strong Chinese response – one that is already reverberating through defense supply lines.
Chinese Export Controls & Impact on Defense Programs
Within months of Trump’s inauguration, the U.S.-China trade confrontation escalated into a rare earth standoff. China’s Ministry of Commerce announced export controls on seven categories of rare earth materials (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium – primarily medium and heavy rare earths).
Effective immediately as of April 2025, these measures require special licenses for any export of the listed minerals and cover finished products like rare earth magnets. Beijing’s move was explicitly framed as retaliation to Trump’s tariff hikes, aimed at “choking off supplies” of critical components to U.S. and allied industries.
While not a full embargo, the new controls give Chinese authorities power to throttle rare earth shipments by slowing or denying export licenses as reported (opens in a new tab) in Reuters. In practice, this has introduced significant uncertainty and delays for U.S. companies dependent on Chinese feedstocks.
Analysts note three immediate implications: A temporary pause or slowdown in exports as China implements the licensing regime; potential selective denials targeting U.S. defense and aerospace firms (indeed, China simultaneously put 16 U.S. defense-related entities on an export blacklist, limiting their access to dual-use goods), and pressure on other countries to stay in China’s good graces to keep their supply flowing. The effect on U.S. defense programs has been alarming and adjustments. Companies like Raytheon, Honeywell, and Lockheed have been scouring non-Chinese sources for the specific grades of rare earth metals now under license.
Some of these – for example, dysprosium and terbium – are crucial for the heat-resistant magnets used in fighter jet electric motors and actuators. Without a stable supply, the development of next-gen platforms could stall. U.S. media, including REEx, have reported concerns that America’s upcoming sixth-generation fighter (the F-47) might face delays because critical rare earth components in its avionics and engines are suddenly harder to obtain. By contrast, China’s own military programs remain secure in their domestic supply; tellingly, Chinese manufacturers just unveiled two prototype sixth-generation fighters of their own, which are likely proceeding on schedule with uninterrupted access to materials.
As one analysis at CSIS warned, “further bans on critical mineral inputs will only widen the gap, enabling China to strengthen its military capabilities more quickly than the United States.” In other words, China’s restrictions exploit a U.S. vulnerability – reliance on Chinese materials – to gain a strategic edge in the race for advanced weapons.
Specific examples of the impact include:
- Fighter jet production: The F-47 program (Next Generation Air Dominance) was contracted to Boeing in March 2025, but just weeks later China’s export curbs forced U.S. suppliers to scramble for key inputs. High-performance magnets and yttrium-based coatings for the F-47’s engines and systems are among the items now under export license. SFA Oxford, a consultancy, noted that without reliable access to neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium, U.S. sixth-gen jets could hit production bottlenecks. Meanwhile, China, as the dominant miner and refiner of these elements, can prioritize its own military needs. Chinese expertshave openly suggested that Beijing’s rare earth policy is apressure point to “deal a blow” to flagship U.S. programs like the F-47.
- Missiles and munitions: Heavy rare earths like dysprosium are needed for the magnets in fin actuators of missiles (keeping magnets coercive at high temperatures). Any slowdown in dysprosium exports could impact production of systems such as the new Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) or hypersonic weapon prototypes that use these materials. So far, DoD is assessing stockpiles and might allocate strategic reserves of dysprosium and terbium to certain missile programs to avoid schedule slips. However, those stockpiles are limited – the U.S. National Defense Stockpile contains some rare earth inventory, but “not enough to supply its defense contractors in perpetuity.”
- Sonar and electronic warfare systems: The Navy’s suppliers of advanced sonar transducers (Terfenol-D) and the Air Force’s suppliers of yttrium garnet radar components also report trouble securing Chinese shipments. Yttrium is now controlled, and it is essential for radar tuning devices and high-power laser systems. A CleanTechnica analysis highlighted that yttrium-based thermal barrier coatings – crucial for jet engines and lasers – are on the restricted list, meaning U.S. contractors must find workarounds or substitutes quickly.
In addition to all this, China’s export curbs don’t just limit raw ores—they also cover finished magnet products. This is significant because the magnet manufacturing industry is heavily China-centric, even if rare earth oxides can be sourced elsewhere. Chinese companies produced an estimated 138,000–150,000 tons of NdFeB magnets in 2018, dwarfing all other countries (the U.S. had essentially zero domestic output then).
In 2024, one estimate pegged China’s NdFeB magnet output at 300,000 tons, while U.S. startup efforts produced only a few hundred tons at best. So, the Chinese controls on magnets could be even more immediately disruptive– Western manufacturers can’t just plug-and-play replace that capacity overnight. Already, manufacturers in Japan and South Korea – two alternative magnet sources – have seen a surge in demand as U.S. and European firms try to hedge against Chinese supply risk. Prices for certain heavy rare earth oxides spiked after the announcement, raising costs for defense hardware.
The Chinese government defends its export controls as legitimate and claims they are about ensuring “national security and international non-proliferation compliance”. However, few in the West miss the real message: Beijing is weaponizing its dominance in the rare earth sector. As one Chinese military commentator put it, these measures “strike directly at a core spot of the US,” highlighting that the U.S. military’s supply chains remain deeply entwined with its primary strategic rival.
Diversifying Supply—How About Allies and “De-Risking” Initiatives
Facing these supply threats, the United States is not alone in seeking alternatives. A global realignment of rare earth supply chains is underway, with U.S. allies and partners – Australia, Japan, Europe, and others – playing key roles in de-risking and diversifying away from China. The challenge is significant: China still has an overwhelming lead, especially in heavy rare earth refining, where it has 99% of global processing capacity as of 2023. Nonetheless, recent years have seen momentum build for non-Chinese projects as REEx was launched to chronicle:
- Australia: As one of the few countries with sizable rare earth reserves, Australia is critical to allied supply plans. Lynas Rare Earths Ltd., based in Australia, is the largest producer of separated rare earth oxides outside China. Lynas operates the Mt. Weld mine and a processing plant in Malaysia, and with U.S. DoD funding, it’s building a new separation facility in Texas for heavy rare earths. However, even Lynas has depended on China for the final refining of certain products. Australia is actively working to change that – for instance, the Browns Range project in Western Australia aims to become the first significant dysprosium producer outside China, targeting ~279 metric tons of dysprosium output per year once fully operational. Still, the project must scale up refining capabilities to truly break China’s monopoly in heavy REEs. As of now, experts expect Australia will remain reliant on Chinese toll refining for at least some rare earth products until 2026, but that inflection point is fast approaching. The Australian government has also launched a Critical Minerals R&D Hub to coordinate innovation in processing tech, often in partnership with U.S. and Japanese researchers.
- Japan: Japan learned a harsh lesson when China cut off rare earth shipments briefly in 2010 (during a diplomatic spat), and since then, Tokyo has led in investing in alternative supply. Japanese firms provided early funding to Lynas; Japan has a stockpile of rare earths and has quietly supported research into recycling and substitution. A Japan-Vietnam joint initiative has established a RareEarth Research Center in Hanoi to develop processing know-how outside China. Japan also nurtures domestic magnet makers like Daido and Hitachi to ensure a non-Chinese supply of high-performance magnets for its auto and defense industries. For the U.S., Japan is a natural partner: Japanese magnet manufacturers (e.g., in Malaysia or Thailand facilities) are seen as a source for China-free NdFeB magnets that meet defense-grade specs.
- Europe (EU): European countries, though less defense-focused than the U.S., are also anxious to reduce Chinese dependence for both economic and security reasons. The EU’s new Critical Raw Materials Act (enacted in 2023) set targets to extract and process a greater share of critical minerals in Europe. Several projects are in development: Estonia hosts a rare earth separation facility (NPM Silmet) that processes small volumes of magnet metals; Sweden recently discovered significant rare earth deposits(Kiruna region) that could be mined in coming years; and Germany and France are investing in research on recycling magnets from end-of-life equipment. A Reuters report noted that companies are trying to forge a rare earth supply chain within Europe, but major production (on the order of thousands of tons of oxides) may not come online until 2028–2030 at the earliest. In the meantime, Europe is also courting suppliers like Australia and the U.S. – for example, a French-backed project is exploring investment in Canada’s rare earth industry.
- Others: Canada and Brazil have noteworthy reserves and are friendly sources. Canada’s government has identified rare earth mining and processing as a strategic priority and is collaborating with the U.S. defense to develop projects (one example is a proposed heavy rare earth separation plant in Saskatchewan). However, President Trump’s hostile overtures to Canada have not helped the cause. However, Trump recently met with Canada’s prime minister, who launched the next round of economic discussions. Brazil has significant rare earth deposits and even an operating mine (Minas Gerais), though much of its concentrate historically went to China. Recently, Brazilian companies like Serra Verde have been working on local processing. Interestingly, Serra Verde ships some products to China but could pivot if Western processing facilities emerge. REEx has reviewed Brazilian Rare Earths reporting significant promise in rich deposits and the potential for a refinery and access to a deep-water port. Vietnam, as mentioned, has potential in heavy rare earth separation (with Japanese help). India and South Africa also have resources (monazite sands in India, bastnaesite in South Africa), but their industries are nascent.
The U.S. government is actively supporting these ally’ efforts as part of a strategy to build a resilient supply network. A CSIS report emphasizes the importance of “financial and diplomatic support” for allied rare earth initiatives because those projects will form the backbone of an alternative supply chain. For instance, the U.S. DFC (normally focused on developing nations) might invest in projects like Vietnam’s refinery or Australia’s processing plants to ensure they succeed.
Additionally, “friendshoring” is happening, and defense contractors are adjusting supply lines to source magnets and materials from friendlier nations. Japan and Australia are obvious preferred sources, but even suppliers in South Korea or within the Americas are being tapped to step in for China. This global realignment will take time, but it is clearly accelerating under the pressure of China’s recent restrictions.
Toward Rare Earth Resilience–How Soon Can the U.S. Rebuild?
The race is on to establish a secure rare earth supply chain for the U.S. defense industrial base. Both policy and industry moves since 2020 have narrowed the gap, but significant vulnerabilities remain, especially for heavy rare earth elements that are hardest to source. The timeline for achieving true rare earth supply chain resilience – meaning the U.S. and allies can fully meet defense demand without Chinese inputs – is still uncertain. Optimistic targets center around the mid-to-late 2020s (around the 2027 mark aligned with U.S. policy), but many experts caution that it could slip into the early 2030s before all the pieces (mines, refineries, magnet factories) are in place and scaled. REEx concurs with this latter, more pessimistic vantage. Even with REE industrial policy in place, the U.S. and the West are likely several years away from full resilience.
Some indicators and milestones to watch on the timeline:
- 2025–2026: Several U.S.-funded projects aim to come online. By the end of 2025, MP Materials expects to be producing small batches (hundreds of tons) of NdFeB magnets at its new Fort Worth, TX facility. This deal is tied to General Motors. If successful, this will be the first domestic magnet production of this scale in decades, though still <1% of global output as cited by CSIS. Likewise, Lynas’s U.S. heavy rare earth separation plant in Texas is slated to begin operations in 2026, providing a non-Chinese source of dysprosium and terbium oxides. Australia’s new refining capacity and other allied projects also aim for 2025-26 starts. These will greatly improve sourcing options if they stay on schedule.
- 2027: This is the make-or-break year set by policy. The expectation (or hope) is that by January 1, 2027, enough alternative supply exists such that U.S. defense contractors can fully comply with the Chinese magnet ban without waivers. We may see an uncomfortable period in 2026 where contractors build last-minute stockpiles or push for limited exceptions if projects are delayed. Realistically, heavy REEs (Dy, Tb, etc.) are the biggest concern, since even by 2027, China might still be the only large-scale source of refined heavy rare earths. If substitute designs or stockpile reserves cannot cover the need, the Pentagon might have to issue waivers, or Congress might delay the full ban implementation. However, publicly, the DoD and Congress are holding firm to the date, using it as a spur to industry.
- 2028–2030: By this window, if current plans bear fruit, the landscape should look very different. Multiple mines (in the U.S., Australia, Canada, etc.) could feed multiple separation facilities and magnet plants outside China.
The efforts might start yielding results (e.g., a new magnet factory in the EU or a large-scale processing in Estonia or Sweden).
The U.S. could be in a position to meet its own defense demand and even support allies with rare earth products. However, this optimistic scenario assumes no major setbacks—financing and permitting remain challenges, and China will not sit idle. Beijing could, for instance, drop prices or flood the market to undermine nascent competitors (a tactic it has used before to maintain dominance).
One wildcard in this timeline is how the U.S.-China geopolitical dynamic evolves. President Trump’s current approach is confrontational, seeking to pressure China economically. Yet, Trump is also known for striking deals that suit his goals (recall the “Phase One” trade deal of 2020 in his first term). If rare earth constraints begin to undermine U.S. defense readiness significantly in the near term, Trump might be tempted to negotiate a strategic truce on this front. REEx has suggested this type of dynamic could unfold quickly.
This could take the shape of a limited agreement where China guarantees rare earth deliveries for U.S. defense needs – perhaps in exchange for some tariff relief or other concessions. Such a deal would be politically sensitive (relying on China for critical materials cuts against the grain of decoupling), but Trump has shown pragmatism when American industry is at stake. It’s not inconceivable that behind the fiery rhetoric, backchannel discussions could emerge to secure a stable supply of specific rare earth products through 2027, buying time for the U.S. to get its own capabilities up to speed.
In the grand scheme, however, U.S. strategy is clearly orienting toward independence and allied self-reliance in rare earths. The current trade war has only reinforced the lesson that Beijing’s near-monopoly is a strategic liability. For U.S. defense contractors, the message is that the era of cheap Chinese magnets is ending – now is the time to forge new supply lines or innovate away from heavy dependence on at-risk materials. Initiatives in recycling (recovering rare earths from old electronics and weapons) and material science (developing non-REE substitutes for certain magnets) will also be part of the resilience equation.
Conclusion
Rare earth elements may be hidden inside black boxes and circuit boards, but they have become geopolitically important. The Biden-era policy to eliminate Chinese rare earths from Pentagon supply chains by 2027 set a bold course, and the Trump administration’s actions so far have stayed that course amid a sharpened trade conflict. U.S. defense giants like Lockheed and Raytheon are navigating a delicate transition, replacing a critical input even as global supply is squeezed.
The next few years will test whether America’s industrial base can overcome decades of outsourcing quickly. Allies are stepping up with new mines and refineries, but scale and timing are crucial. If delays mount, President Trump could face a stark choice: either grant temporary reprieves on the Chinese magnet ban or cut an uneasy deal with China to keep U.S. weapons programs on track.
As REEx has chronicled, the path to rare earth supply chain resilience is ultimately a marathon, not a sprint. The U.S. is running that race in earnest now, with 2027 as an important milestone—but true security may only be achieved when global reliance on China’s rare earths is finally a thing of the past.
Sources
Rare Earth Exchanges, U.S. Department of Defense reports; Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis; Reuters and global media coverage of rare earth trade policy including Chinese media (Asian Metals and Shanghai Metals Market) and Chinese rare earth companies such as Baogang Group; Executive Orders and fact sheets from the White House; and industry studies on rare earth supply chains.
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