Highlights

• China dominates rare earth element production and processing, controlling 70-90% of global output and high-strength magnet manufacturing.
• Processing minerals, not just mining them, is now the key to technological and geopolitical advantage in the green and digital transition.
• Western countries must invest in midstream refining, recycling, and alternative sourcing to reduce dependence on Chinese mineral supply chains.

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In a sharp, accessible essay for The World Financial Review (Sept. 23, 2025), Dr. Kalim Siddiqui (opens in a new tab), University of Huddersfield (opens in a new tab) in the UK argues that critical minerals—lithium, cobalt, copper, and especially rare earth elements (REEs)—are the quiet engines of the green and digital transition and the new currency of geopolitical power. In “Rare Earth Critical Minerals: Geopolitics, Supply Chains, and Emerging Tensions,” Siddiqui’s thesis is simple and unsettling: processing capacity—not just rocks in the ground—now decides who holds the keys to clean tech, microchips, and modern defense.

Findings

• Concentration = power. China produces ~70% of rare-earth output and controls ~80–90% of global processing, plus the lion’s share of high-strength magnet manufacturing. That choke point turns REEs from a commodity into a pressure lever.
• Dependence is baked in. The U.S., EU, and Japan remain structurally import-dependent for many critical raw materials, with low recycling rates and few substitutes at scale.
• Processing beats geology. Countries with ore (DRC cobalt, Chile/Argentina/Australia lithium, etc.) often ship to China for refining—where the value, and leverage, are captured.
• Strategy whiplash. Western responses—permit reform, friend-shoring, new alliances, and recycling—are accelerating, but rebuilding full-stack supply chains (mine → refine → components → magnets) is a decade-class lift.

Why it matters for investors, manufacturers, and policymakers

If processing is the new high ground, price spikes and supply shocks migrate from mines to refineries and magnet plants. That risk radiates into EVs, wind, semiconductors, and defense. Siddiqui’s bottom line: security of supply now means securing midstream—refining, separation, and magnet fabrication—not just mining concessions.

So What Next?

• Invest down the stack: Co-finance non-Chinese refining and magnet capacity with guaranteed offtakes and export-credit backstops.
• Close the loop: Scale recycling of REEs, cobalt, nickel, graphite; standardize collection and recovery.
• Design for resilience: Substitute where feasible (chemistries and motors that reduce dysprosium/neodymium), and dual-source critical inputs.
• Middle-power bridges: Leverage Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Brazil, Australia/Canada/EU to host shared midstream and enforce ESG baselines that actually de-risk supply.

Limitations

This is a strategic essay, not an econometric study. Some figures are directional and contested in fast-moving markets; details on project economics, timelines, and policy feasibility are high-level. The geopolitical lens is forthright—critics may find it overly structural—but the core supply-chain insight (processing as power) aligns with broader industry data.

The closer Siddiqui’s piece reads like a dispatch from the near future: in the mineral age, sovereignty is measured in refineries and magnets. Those who can turn ore into engineered materials will set the tempo of the energy transition. Everyone else will dance to it.

Citation: Siddiqui, K. (2025). “Rare Earth Critical Minerals: Geopolitics, Supply Chains, and Emerging Tensions.” The World Financial Review, September 23, 2025.

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