Highlights

• The Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter's success hinges on rare earth elements.
• China currently dominates 70-90% of global production and processing of rare earth elements.
• The U.S. defense strategy involves 'friendshoring' rare earth supply chains across allied nations to reduce dependency.
• The aim is to meet 2027 magnet manufacturing restrictions.
• Securing rare earth supply chains is crucial for advanced aerospace technologies.
• Potential impacts on military capabilities could occur if supply bottlenecks persist.

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America’s next-generation fighter under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) (opens in a new tab) program is meant to secure U.S. air superiority for decades. With adaptive engines, advanced stealth, and a network of “loyal wingman” drones, it embodies cutting-edge aerospace engineering. Yet its success depends on something far less glamorous: rare earth elements (REEs). Neodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium underpin engines, magnets, sensors, and coatings. Without them, a sixth-generation fighter is little more than an expensive paperweight.

“F-47” is used here as an illustrative placeholder for the NGAD crewed platform; the U.S. Air Force has not publicly confirmed an official designation.

NGAD

Rare Earths Inside the NGAD Fighter

Engines

Starter-generators and electrical power units typically use samarium-cobalt or neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets, with dysprosium/terbium added for high-temperature stability. Yttrium-stabilized ceramics line turbine blades, enabling adaptive engines to survive extreme heat.

Avionics & Sensors

Yttrium iron garnets tune radar front-ends; Nd: YAG crystals power lasers and targeting systems; lanthanum and europium enhance optical glass and display phosphors. Estimates for the F-35 put REE content around ~920 pounds (ranges vary by source); a sixth-gen platform will likely be in the same order of magnitude.

Actuators & Drone Interfaces

Electrification of flight controls and weapons bay actuators leans on compact, high-torque NdFeB motors. Dysprosium/terbium doping maintains performance at temperature. Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) wingmen will also rely on REE-based motors and generators.

Bottom line

REEs are the quiet force multipliers behind stealth, thrust, bandwidth, and control precision.

China’s Grip on Supply Chains

China dominates REE production and processing—roughly ~70% of mining, ~90% of refining/separation, and >95% of heavy REEs (Dy/Tb/Y). U.S. defense systems have repeatedly discovered Chinese-linked content buried in otherwise “friendly” supply chains.

The vulnerability surfaced publicly in 2022, when the Pentagon paused some F-35 deliveries after finding a Chinese-origin samarium-cobalt alloy in a Honeywell engine component; deliveries resumed under a national-security waiver.

In 2024–2025, Beijing tightened export controls on critical minerals, including categories relevant to REEs and magnet alloys. Clarification: Chinese state-linked commentary and media suggested U.S. flagship programs (like the next-gen fighter) could be impacted; this was rhetoric by commentators, not an official Chinese government policy statement specifically naming NGAD.

The 2027 Magnet Ban

Washington’s phased DFARS restrictions aim to purge Chinese REE magnets from U.S. defense hardware:

• Phase 1 (through 2026): NdFeB/SmCo magnets may not be manufactured in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea; however, Chinese feedstock processed elsewhere can still qualify.
• Phase 2 (from Jan 1, 2027): No Chinese involvement at any stage—mining, refining, alloying, or magnet-making. Every magnet must be fully “China-free.”

The deadline is ambitious. Even Pentagon officials caution that complete de-Sinicization by 2027 is challenging without rapid scale-up and flawless execution.

Building a New Supply Chain

MP Materials (USA). Mountain Pass produces light REEs (Nd/Pr) and separated oxides. A Fort Worth plant has begun its first NdFeB magnet output. DoD invested $400M and took a minority equity stake; a “10X” facility targeting ~10,000 t/y by 2028 is planned. Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) refers to MP Materials as the treasure trove of American rare earth elements, but they won’t be able to do it alone.

Note the 10,000 t/y figure is a plan/target subject to permitting, financing, construction, and commissioning risk; timelines can slip in practice.

Other players include:

• Lynas (Australia/USA). A Texas heavy-REE separation plant (Dy/Tb/Y) is slated for ~2026, unlocking key magnet dopants outside China—critical to meeting DFARS Phase 2. But rumblings are this could be delayed, maybe even redirected?
• Noveon Magnetics (USA). Texas-based, operating at a smaller scale with a focus on recycling and eco-forward NdFeB manufacturing; strategically useful for niche/urgent defense needs.
• Japan & Vietnam. Japan (Hitachi/Daido/Proterial) maintains non-Chinese magnet capacity and stockpiles; Southeast Asia facilities can produce DFARS-compliant magnets if supplied with non-Chinese feedstock.
• Europe. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act is catalyzing refining/recycling pilots; Estonia’s Silmet operates at modest volumes; Sweden’s Kiruna deposit expands upstream potential. EU magnet factories are under discussion for the late 2020s.
• Canada, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, & Others. Multiple allied separation/refining projects are advancing; U.S.–Saudi mine-to-magnet collaboration is being explored, leveraging capital to accelerate timelines.

Strategy: “Friendshoring” across North America, Australia, Asia, and Europe to reduce single-point failure risk.

Can It Happen in Time?

• MP Materials: Initial U.S. magnet output ~2025 is on the order of ~1,000 t/y; scaling toward 10,000 t/y lands post-2027. This, of course, assumes near flawless execution.
• Lynas Texas heavy-REEs: 2026 target is pivotal; delays would pinch Dy/Tb availability for high-temp magnets. REEx wonders about this date.
• Allied magnet capacity: Japan/Korea/Europe can help if they secure non-Chinese oxides/metals.

Bridging tactics include stockpiling, design tweaks to reduce Dy/Tb, and SmCo substitution in select roles. Realistically, some analysts see the early 2030s for robust, fully China-independent capacity; others are more optimistic. The Pentagon may need targeted waivers to avoid program disruptions if bottlenecks persist, though policy intent remains firm.

Safeguarding Supply: Policy Paths

• Expand U.S. mining, separation, and recycling via DPA and streamlined permitting; scale REE recovery from end-of-life motors/equipment.
• Allied coordination & finance (e.g., U.S. DFC) to co-fund upstream/downstream projects and build shared stockpiles.
• Innovation & substitution: accelerate iron-nitride, nanocrystalline, or lower-Dy NdFeB; deploy SmCo where weight/size penalties are acceptable; push manufacturing process innovations to cut heavy-REE intensity.
• Strategic inventories of Dy/Tb/Nd/Pr to buffer shocks through 2027–2029 ramp years.

Goal: Industrial resilience and denial of coercive leverage over U.S. defense.

Conclusion: Rocks and Jets

NGAD’s edge in the air may hinge on metallurgy and minerals on the ground. Rare earth elements have moved from obscure inputs to strategic levers capable of shaping military balance. The next two years will test whether a secure, allied mine-to-magnet chain can scale fast enough for 2027. If it does, America’s next-gen air dominance is far more resilient. If not, a shortage of a few grams of dysprosium can hobble a platform worth hundreds of millions.  REEx notes the timelines are incredibly short, meaning success equates to flawless program execution with no complicating risk factors.   That’s a major assumption.

The roar of the next-gen fighter will only be heard if the quiet, unglamorous work of rebuilding rare earth supply chainssucceeds.