Highlights
- Trump's National Security Strategy reflects resource realism: China's dominance in gallium and rare earth refining now limits U.S. military and tech options more than ideology.
- Gallium presents a unique strategic constraintโunlike rare earths, U.S. aluminum refining collapse leaves no viable substitute path for advanced semiconductors and weapons systems.
- For investors, the shift is clear: critical minerals are no longer mere inputs but strategic constraints that cap geopolitical ambition and reshape policy priorities.
An essay published December 22, 2025 by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft argues (opens in a new tab) that the Trump administrationโs new National Security Strategy is best read not as ideology, but as resource realism. Writing in Responsible Statecraft, economist James K. Galbraith contends that fossil fuels and critical mineralsโespecially rare earths and galliumโnow quietly shape U.S. strategic choices, from accommodating Russia to softening confrontation with China.
Table of Contents
For investors, the implication is blunt
Supply-chain physics are beginning to outweigh alliance politics.
Franklyย Rare Earth Exchangesโขย has reported that while not nearly sufficient as measured by industrial policy, the Trump administration is the first in Washington, DC to take this matter seriously, as measured by clear action over the past several months.
Rare Earths and Gallium: The Hard Constraint
Galbraithโs core claim is that Chinaโs dominance in rare earth refining and gallium supply now constrains U.S. military and technological options. He distinguishes between the two: rare earth processing monopolies could, with time and capital, erode; gallium is different. U.S. aluminum refining capacity collapsed decades ago, leaving China with overwhelming control of galliumโan input with no viable substitute in advanced semiconductors, radar, and weapons systems.
The factual base here is solid. Independent industry and government sources confirm Chinaโs near-total control of gallium output and its commanding share of rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing. Where Galbraith goes furtherโarguing that the U.S. therefore cannot โconfront China and prevailโโhe moves from supply-chain analysis into strategic inference. It is plausible, but not testable.
Where the Argument Holdsโand Where It Strains
What holds up:
- Chinaโs refining chokehold is real and immediate.
- Gallium substitution at scale is not currently feasible.
- Western re-industrialization timelines lag defense and AI demand.
Where readers should pause:
- The essay assumes that material dependence naturally leads to dรฉtente. History suggests other responses: subsidies, stockpiles, coercive industrial policy, and strategic decoupling.
- Claims of Europeโs โdeindustrializationโ overreach. Europe is under stress; collapse is not a settled fact.
Why This Matters for Rare Earth Markets
The real signal is not Trump, China, or Russia. It is the implicit admission that critical minerals now cap geopolitical ambition. If this logic spreads in Washington, expect short-term tolerance of Chinese leverage alongside louderโbut slowerโefforts to rebuild mine-to-magnet capacity in the U.S. and allied states.
For investors, this reinforces a core REEx thesis: critical minerals are no longer just inputs. They are strategic constraints.
About the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Founded in 2019 and based in Washington, D.C., the Quincy Institute is a U.S. foreign-policy think tank advocating realism, restraint, and reduced reliance on military intervention. Named after President John Quincy Adams, it challenges interventionist orthodoxy across party lines and declines funding from foreign governments.
Source: James K. Galbraith, Responsible Statecraft, (opens in a new tab) Dec. 22, 2025.
ยฉ 2025 Rare Earth Exchangesโข โ Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.
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