Highlights

• Concordia University review reveals China controls approximately 90% of rare earth refining capacity.
• This creates processing bottlenecks that mining diversification alone cannot solve.
• Even Western-mined rare earths flow to China for purification.
• This situation exposes dual-use supply chains spanning electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, F-35 fighters, and defense systems.
• The study concludes that strategic autonomy requires commercial-scale separation and magnet manufacturing capacity, not just new mines.
• Recycling of rare earths remains under 5% globally.

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A comprehensive new review (opens in a new tab) led by Karim Zaghib of Concordia University, with colleagues Ningaraju G. Ningappa, Karthik Vishweswariah, Anil Kumar M.R., Jeremy I.G. Dawkins, and Thiago M. Guimaraes Selva, delivers a sobering conclusion for policymakers and investors alike: diversifying rare earth mining alone will not reduce supply-chain risk. Published in Energy Storage Materials (2026), the review maps the entire rare earth metals (REM) value chain and finds that China’s near-total dominance of processing, separation, and magnet-grade refining—not geology—remains the decisive source of leverage over dual-use technologies spanning clean energy and defense.

Study Methods

This is a wide-ranging, evidence-dense review that synthesizes global data on resources, production, beneficiation, leaching, separation, recycling, market dynamics, and policy responses. The authors integrate mining statistics, process engineering literature, life-cycle assessments, and application case studies (EVs, wind turbines, aerospace, missiles, and electronics) to trace where value and vulnerability actually concentrate. The analysis explicitly contrasts upstream resource abundance with downstream technical bottlenecks.

Key Findings: why processing matters as much, if not more than mines.

The paper documents that rare earths are geochemically abundant but economically constrained by difficult separation chemistry and scale-dependent refining. China accounts for ~70% of mining and ~90% of global refining capacity, including solvent extraction circuits and magnet manufacturing. Even where mining exists elsewhere (U.S., Australia, Brazil, Africa), intermediates often still flow to China for final purification, leaving importers exposed. China also maintains excess processing capacity and can modulate exports—especially of heavy rare earths (Dy, Tb)—to preserve leverage.

Dual-use Consequences

Because the same materials underpin EV motors, wind turbines, grid electronics, and advanced weapons, the authors frame rare earths as a dual-use strategic input. The review notes that a single F-35 fighter contains hundreds of kilograms of REMs; NdFeB and SmCo magnets are irreplaceable in high-temperature motors and actuators; and phosphors, catalysts, and alloys span both civilian and military platforms. Processing chokepoints, therefore, translates directly into national-security exposure.

What could reduce dependence?

The authors outline pathways that could theoretically rebalance the system: green metallurgy (ionic liquids, deep eutectic solvents), AI-assisted separation, digital traceability, and—most promising—closed-loop recycling. Yet they emphasize today’s reality: <5% of rare earths are recycled globally, and most advanced separation technologies remain at pilot scale. Without a large, capital-intensive midstream build-out outside China, diversification efforts stall.

Implications for the U.S. and allies.

The review reinforces a core Rare Earth Exchanges™ thesis: mines without midstream are a false solution. President Trump recently acknowledged this in a speech. Policy incentives (Trump 2.0 DoD offtakes, CHIPS-adjacent funding, EU Critical Raw Materials Act) help, but permitting timelines, environmental constraints, skills shortages, and high costs continue to slow Western separation and magnet capacity. Strategic autonomy requires credible, commercial-scale separation, alloying, and magnet manufacturing, not just ore.

Limitations and Controversy

As a review, the paper does not present new experimental breakthroughs, and some forward-looking claims (AI-enabled separation, rapid recycling scale-up) remain aspirational. Environmental trade-offs are acknowledged but not quantified uniformly across regions. Still, the central conclusion—that processing concentration is the real risk—is well supported by data and aligns with observed trade behavior.

Bottom Line

The study’s key insight is stark: diversifying mining alone does not reduce risk. Import-dependent regions will remain exposed unless they build resilient processing capacity. For investors and policymakers, the signal is clear—the battle for rare earth security is won or lost in the midstream.

Citation: Ningappa N.G. et al., Energy Storage Materials 84 (2026) 104799. DOI: 10.1016/j.ensm.2025.104799.