Highlights
- G7 announces $6.4B critical minerals alliance to challenge China's monopoly.
- China controls 85% of rare earth oxide refining and 90% of magnet production, maintaining its strategic leverage despite Western funding pledges.
- Capital commitments don't equal capacity: bringing new separation facilities online takes years.
- Even U.S. facilities still ship concentrate to China for processing, exposing the midstream gap in Western supply chains.
- Projects span Canada with partners from Japan, Germany, France, and the U.S., targeting graphite, scandium, and rare earth refining.
- Political theater risks funding exploration without securing industrial-scale processing capacity.
The G7โs newly minted โcritical minerals alliance,โ announced in Toronto, sounds ambitious: C$6.4 billion (US$4.57 billion) pledged to fund mines, refineries, and R&D aimed at breaking Chinaโs rare earth monopoly. But despite the headlines, the reality on the groundโand in the supply chainโis far messier. As one Chinese analyst noted bluntly, rare earths will โremain an important cardโ in Beijingโs diplomacy. That statement, while defensive, is accurate.
Table of Contents
A Canadian-driven deal of potential magnitude and scale, USA involvement was nowhere to be found.
Promises Are Easy, Processing Is Hard
The G7โs plan to diversify mineral supply sounds impressive until one recalls that China didnโt gain dominance through announcementsโit built it through decades of investment, state-directed subsidies, and brutal price wars that wiped out competitors. Today, China refines over 85% of the worldโs rare earth oxides and produces roughly 90% of NdFeB magnets.
Canadaโs promised billions may seed projects, but bringing new separation facilities online takes years, not months. Even the U.S., with Mountain Pass running at full tilt, still ships its concentrate to China for final processing. Investors should note: capital commitments donโt equal capacity.
The Card Beijing Keeps Close
Anย official Canadian Governmentย report (opens in a new tab), and other media, correctly underscore Chinaโs continued leverage. The October 30 TrumpโXi โBusan truceโ only suspended one round of controlsโit left all meaningful export restrictions untouched. Beijing can still squeeze terbium, dysprosium, and NdFeB magnets at will. That means the G7 alliance launches from a position of dependency, not dominance. The timing isnโt a coincidence; this is China reminding the world who holds the metallurgical keys.
Between Hope and Hype
The G7 alliance could, over time, seed a genuine alternative ecosystemโif the funds are deployed strategically across refining, magnet production, and recycling. But thereโs a risk of political theater: the West funding exploration without securing midstream capacity will only shift dependency from ore to oxide. The media spin suggests a โnew dawn,โ but the numbers show a long dusk before any true independence.
Investor Takeaway
This initiative is directionally sound but insufficiently muscular. Chinaโs grip remains ironclad for the foreseeable future. Until the G7 nations fund processing and magnet-making on an industrial scale, Beijingโs โimportant cardโ will keep playing itself.
Projects
| Company/Project | Location | Key Partners & Offtakes | Investment/Financing | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nouveau Monde Graphite โ Matawinie Mine | Montreal, Quebec | Government of Canada; Panasonic (Japan); Traxys (Luxembourg); Government of Japan (investment intent) | > $35 M from Canada Growth Fund; LOI from Canada Infrastructure Bank; up to US$430 M LOI from Export Development Canada; additional contributions from Panasonic Energy and Mitsui & Co. | Creates North Americaโs largest fully integrated natural graphite facility; strengthens global graphite diversification and Canadaโs supply-chain leadership. |
| Rio Tinto โ Scandium Production Plant | Sorel-Tracy, Quebec | Government of Canada (offtake agreement) | ~$25 M equity-like royalty investment from Canada Growth Fund | Expands demo plant to commercial scale; significantly boosts allied scandium supply security. |
| Ucore Rare Metals Inc. โ Kingston Facility | Kingston, Ontario | Vacuumshmelze (Germany); Permag (USA); feedstock MOUs with Hastings and ABx (Australia); tech agreement with Metallium (Australia); support from Gov. of Ontario (permitting) | Up to $36.3 M from Gov. of Canada ($26.3 M NRCan + $10 M FedDev Ontario) | Scales RapidSXโข processing for samarium and gadolinium; first-of-its-kind commercial refinery in North America; bridges midstream rare earth gap. |
| Torngat Metals โ Strange Lake Project | Northern Quebec | Carester (France) โ offtake and technology collaboration | Not disclosed | Integrates Canadian REE mining with French processing expertise; enhances Western REE cooperation. |
| Vianode โ Synthetic Graphite Facility | St. Thomas, Ontario | GM (USA) โ offtake agreement; Germany (export credit guarantee interest) | LOI up to US$500 M from Export Development Canada; LOI from Canada Infrastructure Bank; up to US$300 M export credit guarantee interest from German Gov. | Supports large-scale synthetic graphite production for EV batteries; deepens transatlantic financing links. |
| Northern Graphite โ Lac des Iles Project | Montreal, Quebec | Alkeemia (Italy) โ offtake and toll processing LOI; graphite purification pilot in Porto Marghera | ย | ย |
Summary:
This REEx analysis dissects the G7โs new critical minerals allianceโambitious in rhetoric but years from changing the balance of power. The article clarifies whatโs real (funding pledges, R&D cooperation) versus whatโs speculative (short-term decoupling). For investors, the takeaway is clear: China still controls the midstream, and the Westโs challenge has just begun.
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