Highlights

• China controls 90%+ of rare earth magnet production critical to missiles, drones, and stealth aircraft—creating a supply chain vulnerability that constrains Western military capability regardless of weapons design.
• Stockpiles of rare earth oxides buy time but not independence: oxides aren't magnets, and magnet blocks aren't mission-ready components in the mine-to-magnet industrial chain.
• Modern warfare is increasingly limited by materials availability measured in grams of dysprosium, not weapons design—precision strike campaigns can deplete munitions faster than supply chains dependent on Chinese manufacturing can replace them.

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In any serious conflict, the decisive factor is not the weapon itself—but the industrial system behind it. Missiles, drones, and stealth aircraft may capture headlines, but their staying power depends on something far less glamorous: motors, actuators, sensors, and the rare earth magnets inside them. The systems often cited—Delilah, SPICE, Rampage, F-35I, Tomahawk, B-2—are all real, fielded, and relevant. But claims about their specific use in strikes against Iran remain largely unverified in open sources. Consequently,Rare Earth Exchanges™ treats such lists as capability menus, not confirmed deployment logs.

The Monopoly Behind the Missile

The deeper story is supply concentration. China controls roughly 60% of rare earth mining, ~90%+ of refining, and ~90–94% of permanent magnet production.  This matters because NdFeB and SmCo magnets are embedded across all these systems—in guidance fins, radar arrays, UAV motors, and aircraft subsystems.

In other words:

The hard reality: the West does not control the inputs required to sustain its most advanced weapons.

A More Precise Reading of the Arsenal

Several common misconceptions deserve correction:

• SPICE is not a “bomb,” but a guidance kit developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems (opens in a new tab).
• Rampage (opens in a new tab) is best understood as an air-launched derivative of guided rocket technology, not a traditional cruise missile.
• GBU-57 MOP (opens in a new tab) is designed for hardened targets—but official sources avoid naming specific countries.

These distinctions matter. Precision language reflects precision thinking—and too often, reporting blurs both.

Supply Chains: From Prime Contractor to Periodic Table

Across systems, the architecture repeats:

Missiles (Delilah, Rampage, Tomahawk)

Prime contractors: Elbit Systems / Israel Aerospace Industries / RTX Corporation

Chain: airframe → propulsion → guidance → datalink → actuation systems

Critical node: fin actuators powered by NdFeB magnets.

Precision Kits (SPICE)

Prime: Rafael Advanced Defense Systems

Chain: warhead → EO/IR seeker → navigation → control surfaces

• Critical node: sensors + actuators (magnet-intensive).

Aircraft (F-35I, F-15I, F/A-18)

Primes: Lockheed Martin, Boeing

Subsystems: Pratt & Whitney, GE Aerospace, Northrop Grumman

• Magnets are embedded everywhere—from turbomachinery to radar systems.
• Notably, the F-35 program has already experienced supply disruptions tied to Chinese-origin magnet materials.

Drones (Harop, Harpy, Heron)

Prime: Israel Aerospace Industries

Chain: propulsion → sensors → datalink → onboard compute → motor control systems

• UAVs are magnet-heavy platforms due to electric actuation and stabilization.

Magnets: The Real Bill of Materials

Two magnet classes dominate:

• NdFeB (Neodymium-Iron-Boron) – high power density
• SmCo (Samarium-Cobalt) – high temperature resilience

Typical composition: ~30% rare earth content (Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb).

Heavy rare earths—dysprosium and terbium—are especially critical for high-temperature performance in defense systems. As Rare Earth Exchanges has chronicled, these heavy rare earth elements are increasingly difficult to obtain.

Stockpiles: A Buffer, Not a Solution

The National Defense Stockpile, managed by the Defense Logistics Agency, is shifting focus:

• NdPr oxide
• NdFeB magnet blocks
• SmCo alloys
• Dysprosium and terbium (tens of metric tons scale)

But here is the catch:

Oxides are not magnets.

Magnet blocks are not mission-ready components.

Stockpiles buy time—but not independence.

Where the Narrative Breaks Down

The most persistent blind spot in media and policy:

• Mining ≠ supply chain
• Oxides ≠ magnets
• Capability ≠ production capacity

The real bottleneck sits in midstream processing and magnet manufacturing, where China’s dominance remains overwhelming.

The Quiet Constraint on Modern War

The most important insight is also the least discussed:

Modern warfare is increasingly constrained not by weapons design but by the availability of materials, which presuppose an entire industrial-scale supply chain. A precision-strike campaign can burn through munitions faster than supply chains can replenish them. And those supply chains hinge on components measured not in tons—but in grams of dysprosium.  Where have Western elites (politicians, corporate executives, media influencers) been the past decade as this unfolded?

Bottom Line

This is not just a military story. It is an industrial one.

The West can design world-class weapons.

But until it controls the mine-to-magnet chain, it cannot fully sustain them. In the next conflict, the limiting factor may not be missiles.

It may be magnets. And America’s number one competitor controls them.