Highlights

• The U.S. and Japan are formalizing a joint framework on March 19, 2026, to develop critical minerals (rare earths, lithium, and copper) through four initial U.S.-based projects involving Mitsubishi Materials and Mitsui & Co.
• The initiative aims to reduce reliance on China, which controls 60% of global rare earth mining and 85–90%+ of refining capacity, by building an allied supply chain combining recycling, refining, and upstream mining.
• Projects include rare earth refining and copper recycling in Indiana; lithium mining in North Carolina with Albemarle; Arizona’s Copper World project (~$550M); plus potential cooperation on seabed resources near Hawaii and Japan.

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The United States and Japan are expected to formalize a joint framework for developing critical minerals—including rare earths, lithium, and copper—during a March 19, 2026, leaders’ meeting in Washington, according to reporting by Nikkei. The initiative is explicitly designed to reduce reliance on China and reinforce allied supply chains across key industrial inputs.

Japanese trading and materials firms—including Mitsubishi Materials and Mitsui & Co.—are expected to participate in four initial U.S.-based projects, signaling a shift from policy coordination to capital deployment and asset-level collaboration.

From Policy to Projects: Early Assets Take Shape

The proposed “U.S.–Japan National Minerals Project” will reportedly include four initial developments:

• Rare earth refining (Indiana): Focused on recycling rare earth elements from end-of-life magnets, electronics, and industrial equipment
• Copper recycling/refining (Indiana): Processing e-waste (e.g., circuit boards) into refined copper, in partnership with a UK firm
• Lithium mining (North Carolina): Mitsui exploring potential joint investment with U.S.-based Albemarle, a global lithium leader
• Copper World project (Arizona): Backed by Mitsubishi Corp. (~¥87 billion / ~$550M), targeting production around 2029 in partnership with Canada’s Hudbay Minerals

The portfolio reflects a balanced strategy—combining recycling, refining, and upstream mining—rather than relying solely on greenfield extraction.

The Bigger Play: Coordinated Industrial Policy

Beyond individual projects, both governments are expected to launch a joint action plan to strengthen critical mineral supply chain resilience, including:

• Coordinated development strategies and investment alignment
• Establishment of bilateral working groups
• Measures to support semiconductor and EV supply chains

One notable—though still conceptual—proposal involves a “minimum price guarantee” mechanism, potentially implemented via tariffs among aligned countries to stabilize pricing and counter market volatility influenced by Chinese supply. Details remain limited and unconfirmed.

Beyond Land: Strategic Interest in Seabed Resources

The talks are also expected to include cooperation on marine mineral development, with areas of interest including:

• Manganese resources near Hawaii
• Rare earth-rich deposits near Japan’s Minamitorishima Island

This signals growing alignment on deep-sea resource exploration as a future supply frontier, though commercial timelines remain uncertain.

Why This Matters: A Targeted Response to Structural Dependence

Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry estimates:

• China accounts for ~60% of global rare earth mining
• And ~85–90%+ of refining and separation capacity

This initiative represents a deliberate attempt to build an allied, parallel supply chain—anchored in the U.S. but supported by Japanese capital and industrial expertise.  So a Rare Earth Exchanges™ takeaway: While still early-stage and light on binding commitments, this move reflects a more operational phase of U.S.–Japan alignment—shifting from strategy to execution in critical minerals.

Disclaimer: This report is based on information published by Chinese state-affiliated media citing Japanese sources. While directionally credible, specific project details and policy mechanisms should be independently verified through official U.S., Japanese, or third-party disclosures.