Highlights
- China’s dominance in rare earth elements resulted from strategic planning, subsidies, and lax environmental standards, while U.S. policy remained complacent.
- The U.S. government is now taking steps to diversify rare earth supply chains, including restarting domestic production and collaborating with allies.
- The Department of Defense is actively working to reduce supply chain risks for critical materials essential to military capabilities.
What is the U.S. government doing to ensure more stable, less risky conditions associated with the worldwide supply chain of rare earth materials, such as elements and minerals? While China spent a couple decades planning, executing and then protecting what is essentially a monopoly over rare earth material refining, the U.S. government was essentially checked out, not concerned. So, what happened and what is the government now doing about it?
The U.S. government’s decision-making around China’s control of the rare earth elements (REEs) market stems from a combination of factors that evolved over several decades. Rare earth elements are crucial for a wide range of industries, including electronics, renewable energy, defense, and advanced technologies. China’s dominance in this market did not happen overnight, and U.S. policy responses have been slow and reactive rather than proactive. Rare Earth Exchange provides an overview of what happened (in a simplified form) and then introduces what the government is doing about it today via a recent white paper published by the General Accounting Office (GAO).
First and foremost, we can factor in market forces and economic considerations when trying to understand the current predicament. Environmental and cost concerns are big. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. had operational rare earth mines, such as the Mountain Pass Mine in California (opens in a new tab), which was a major global supplier. However, environmental regulations in the U.S. became stricter, and the cost of adhering to these standards increased. Mining and processing rare earth elements generate considerable environmental damage, including radioactive waste. The high costs and environmental liabilities made U.S. production less competitive compared to China.
And this is where cheaper Chinese supply comes in. China started to aggressively develop its rare earth industry in the 1980s, offering cheaper production and more relaxed environmental standards. This led to the closure or reduction of U.S. rare earth mining operations, as companies opted to import cheaper Chinese rare earthmaterials.
China’s planningtrajectory can go out decades, if need be, given the type of hybrid, mixed economy (both capitalist and communist).
The Chinese government saw the strategic value in dominating the rare earths market early on. It heavily subsidized the rare earths sector, enabling Chinese companies to sell rare earth elements at lower prices than competitors, driving many non-Chinese producers out of the market. This led to China’s dominance in mining and processing rare earths, with China now controlling about 80% of global rare earth production and processing capacity, If not more in just the refining.
Again, as we discussed previously China’s economic model allowed its leadership to embrace a different kind of end game. China’s focus was not only on controlling the supply but also on building the infrastructure for refining and processing rare earth elements, which added to its dominance. The Chinese government understood the importance of rare earths for future technologies and invested accordingly.
But the current predicament is not just the result of ingenious, shrewd Chinese operatives. This notable failure of U.S. government policy and industry should be addressed.
For example, many U.S. industries focused on short-term profitability rather than long-term strategic resource control, which is a natural consequence of the different systems, ideologies, cultures and governing rules, mores, and norms.
So, as China flooded the market with cheaper rare earths, American mining companies, including the operators of the Mountain Pass mine, either shut down or reduced their operations because they could not compete on price. And those companies that needed the inputs benefitted, at least in the short run, in Chinese goods.
This over-reliance on China became apparent however, at different stages to different players in the market. U.S. industries, particularly in high-tech and defense sectors, began importing rare earth materials from China due to lower costs. This over-reliance was not seen as a problem until China began using its rare earth dominance as geopolitical leverage. But could this not have been anticipated. In many ways Chinese Communist Party ideology remains adversarial to Western market (e.g., capitalistic) dynamics, even though China has embraced the latter as well.
But China’s communist system embraces capitalism as a tool to foster and promote economic growth, accumulation of wealth and geopolitical power. So, China’s dominance over the rare earth supply chain has given it significant geopolitical leverage. In 2010, for example, China temporarily restricted rare earth exports to Japan due to a territorial dispute, showcasing the potential vulnerability of countries reliant on Chinese supplies.
On to the U.S. policy nap, a prolonged nap. For many years, the U.S. government and industry did not view rare earth elements as a strategic priority. The reliance on global supply chains and the assumption that rare earths could always be sourced from somewhere else created a sense of complacency. By the time the strategic implications of China’s dominance became apparent,
China had already solidified its control over much of the global rare earth industry.
Of course, over the past several years the U.S. government awoke out of the nap, while China via its state-owned press incessantly laments that the U.S. now embraces coercive and bullying tactics to reconfigure the rare earths supply chain. But how did China arrive at a monopoly position in the first place? Yes, the U.S. was asleep, focusing on facilitating short term capitalist wealth accumulation at the expense of longer-term national interest considerations. That’s changing, however.
Recognizing the strategic importance of rare earths, the U.S. government has started to take steps to diversify supply. The Department of Defense and other agencies have invested in initiatives to restart domestic rare earth production and processing. There is also a push to work with allies such as Australia and Canada to develop alternative supply chains. However, it will take time to challenge China’s well-established dominance in this area.
Critical materials, such as titanium, tantalum, and tungsten, are key building blocks in many U.S. military weapon systems for instance. They enable unique, high-performance combat capabilities. For example, titanium is a strong, light-weight metal that helps prevent corrosion on weapons used in a variety of climates.
Despite the importance of these materials to the U.S. military, in many cases, their sources (for example, mines) are controlled by nations that the U.S. military is in competition with. This puts U.S national security at risk.
Hence the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts to reduce risks that could affect supply chain (opens in a new tab) access for these materials.
U.S. Policy Paper on Reclaiming the Supply Chain
What follows is a summary of the U.S. government’s current position on what they are doing to regain leverage in the rare earths supply chain worldwide.
In “Critical Materials are in High Demand. What DoD Doing to Secure Supply Chain and Stockpile these Resources (opens in a new tab)” the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) summarizes these U.S. federal efforts to bolster America’s rare earth supply chain position worldwide.
Rare Earth Exchanges includes the published artifact below:
Daniel
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