Highlights
- China controls over 70% of rare earth mineral production and 90% of refining, wielding significant geopolitical leverage.
- U.S. and Western nations struggle to diversify mineral supply chains through strategic investments and international partnerships.
- Rare earth minerals are crucial for advanced technologies in defense, electronics, and electric vehicles, making their control a critical strategic issue.
Renowned metal commodity risk analyst Robert Fig (opens in a new tab) delivers a timely and forceful opinion in The European Conservative, (opens in a new tab) asserting that China’s dominance over rare earth elements (REEs) has reshaped the global geopolitical order and may determine the balance of power for years to come. Fig suggests that President Trump’s interest in Ukraine and Greenland—both geologically rich in REEs—represents a strategic move to erode China’s near-monopoly on this critical class of materials.
Key Claims
- China’s dominance is overwhelming, producing ~70% of REE concentrates and refining over 90%, with near-total control of heavy REEs used in advanced military technologies.
- Environmental externalization has enabled China to lead; Western nations, constrained by environmental regulations and high costs, have fallen behind in mining and refining.
- Fig likens China’s position to OPEC’s historical control of oil, warning that Beijing has weaponized rare earths in disputes with Japan and the U.S., including via export restrictions and bans on processing technology.
- He links U.S. actions in Ukraine and Greenland, as well as its new mining deals in Africa, to desperate attempts to diversify supply.
- The piece is laced with concern that despite Western reindustrialization efforts, the U.S. will produce only a fraction of the REE magnets China can, likely lagging in key sectors like EVs, defense, and advanced electronics.
Assessment of Accuracy and Assumptions
Fig is right on the core premise: rare earths are a chokepoint in the21st-century supply chain, and China has used its leverage—bothmaterially and politically—with increasing sophistication. His warning about environmental double standards and China’s strategic hoarding of refining tech is well-founded and supported by a long trail of policy and trade actions, including the 2023 export ban on REE tech and past cutoffs to Japan.
However, the op-ed falls short of a systems-level understanding of the rare earth supply chain:
1. Mining ≠ Magnets
Fig correctly notes the disparity between U.S. mining and Chinese refining, but he understates the complexity of the midstream gap—especially oxide separation, metal conversion, and magnet fabrication. It’s not just access to ore bodies that matters—China controls the technology stack end-to-end. The West struggles with accepting this reality.
2. Underplaying Private-Sector Innovation
Fig portrays the West as flailing but fails to mention serious developments such as Lynas-Blue Line’s Texas plant, MP Materials’ NdFeB magnet facility (and deal with General Motors) or the DoD-backed magnet supply chain investments under both Trump and Biden.
3. Strategic Alliances Mischaracterized
Fig suggests Trump’s tariffs might alienate allies, but he ignores the more recent U.S.-led multilateral frameworks—like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)—that are actively coordinating REE diversification with Australia, Canada, Japan, and the EU. It’s not too late, as Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) has suggested, for POTUS to reinvigorate Five Eyes and other alliance for mineral security.
4. Assuming Intent in Foreign Policy
The linkage between U.S. interest in Ukraine or Greenland and REEs is speculative. Ukraine’s critical mineral potential (e.g., in the Dnipro and Krivoy Rog basins) is real but not yet strategically developed. Greenland’s Kvanefjeld deposit is controversial and blocked by its government over uranium risks. Yes, the author is likely correct, but so much more goes into the final product, an emphasis the author skirts.
REEx Commentary
Robert Fig’s commentary offers a compelling geopolitical warning, rooted in commodity risk realities. He paints a clear picture of China’s mineral dominance as a threat multiplier, rightly framing the urgency. However, his piece risks overstatement by ignoring recent U.S. and allied supply chain strategies, public-private partnerships, and the technical barriers that matter more than political gestures. It’s quite possible to catch up, but as REEx has declared, industrial policy will help accelerate competitive reach.
Fig’s framing of the rare earth battle as a zero-sum, near-monopolistic struggle is effective, but lacks nuance. A more accurate view acknowledges that supply chain resilience requires years of coordination across mining, refining, manufacturing, and market transparency. Rare earth control is not just about holding the ore—it’s about engineering and industrial policy mastery.
Discuss this topic in the REEx Forum (opens in a new tab).
Leave a Reply