Fitch Sees China’s Rare Earth Dominance Enduring-But the Real Story Runs Even Deeper

Highlights

• Fitch Ratings' China Perspectives podcast correctly identifies that China's rare earth dominance stems from decades of strategic investment in processing, refining, and downstream integration—not just mining—with an estimated $57 billion invested in critical minerals between 2000-2021.
• Myanmar's Kachin State represents a critical vulnerability in China's heavy rare earth supply chain, particularly for dysprosium and terbium, with rebel-controlled deposits ranking as the world's top heavy rare earth asset amid geopolitical fragility.
• Western diversification efforts remain largely narrative without independent midstream capability, as China's advantage extends beyond separation into metallization, magnet manufacturing, precision engineering ecosystems, and AI-enabled industrial infrastructure that democracies may lack the patience to rebuild.

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A recent episode (opens in a new tab) of Fitch Ratings’ “China Perspectives” podcast offered one of the more sober and strategically grounded mainstream assessments of China’s rare earth dominance currently circulating in mainstream financial circles. Featuring BMI commodities (opens in a new tab) strategist Sabrin Chowdhury (opens in a new tab) and hosted by Fitch’s Yin Wang (opens in a new tab), the discussion identified a central truth still routinely missed in much Western media and policymaking: rare earth power is not primarily about mining. It is about processing, refining, downstream integration, industrial ecosystems, and time.

Sabrin Chowdhury, Director, Head of Commodities Analysis (Global) at BMI, a Fitch Solutions Company

Source: Fitch Solutions

What Fitch and BMI Get Right

Chowdhury correctly emphasized that China’s dominance was built deliberately over decades—not through short-term market luck. She noted Beijing invested heavily not only in extraction, but also in midstream refining, processing expertise, industrial scale efficiencies, and environmentally difficult chemical infrastructure while much of the West outsourced those activities.

Equally important, she highlighted the investment asymmetry. BMI estimates China invested roughly $57 billion into critical minerals between 2000 and 2021, dwarfing Western efforts.  Perhaps the podcast’s most important insight came when Chowdhury acknowledged that without independent midstream capability, Western diversification remains more narrative than reality_. Rare Earth Exchanges™_ has repeatedly argued this same point: a mine alone does not create supply chain sovereignty.

Myanmar: The Quiet Achilles’ Heel

The interview also explored China’s dependence on Myanmar’s Kachin State for heavy rare earth feedstock—particularly dysprosium and terbium used in advanced magnets critical to EVs, robotics, drones, missile systems, and wind turbines. Chowdhury referenced disruptions following the Kachin Independence Army’s seizure of mining territory in 2024.

Yet the discussion arguably underplayed the magnitude of the issue.  Covering this issue frequently, the Myanmar rebels’ holdings rank number one in the REEx Insights rankings of heavy rare earth assets.

Kachin is not merely a supply-chain vulnerability. It may represent one of the world’s most strategically sensitive heavy rare earth regions. The environmental destruction, informal mining networks, militia financing structures, humanitarian concerns, and geopolitical fragility surrounding Myanmar’s ionic clay deposits remain poorly appreciated by Western investors and policymakers alike.

What the Podcast Underplays

While the discussion correctly focused on processing, it still framed the rare earth challenge too narrowly.

China’s real advantage increasingly extends beyond separation into:

• Metallization and alloying
• NdFeB and SmCo magnet manufacturing
• Equipment manufacturing and industrial tooling
• Precision engineering ecosystems
• Workforce depth and process knowledge
• Customer qualification and long-cycle industrial relationships

The podcast also only briefly touched on fluorination and metallurgical bottlenecks—highly specialized areas where the West remains structurally weak and where China maintains substantial process advantages.

The Real Strategic Question

One of Chowdhury’s strongest observations was that it would be “naive” to assume industrial policy alone can eliminate Western dependence on China.  That warning may actually understate the challenge. China’s dominance is no longer simply industrial. It is ecosystemic. Beijing now operates deeply integrated supply chains spanning mining, separation, metals, alloys, magnets, batteries, EVs, robotics, renewable energy systems, and increasingly AI-enabled manufacturing infrastructure.

For the United States and Europe, the question is no longer whether diversification is necessary. The question is whether Western democracies possess the political patience, environmental tolerance, engineering workforce, capital discipline, and long-term industrial coordination required to rebuild entire industrial ecosystems rather than simply reopen mines.

About Fitch Ratings

Fitch Ratings is one of the world’s major credit ratings agencies and part of the broader Fitch Group. The company provides sovereign, corporate, and structured finance ratings along with macroeconomic and industry research used widely across institutional finance and global capital markets.

About BMI

BMI, a Fitch Solutions company, provides macroeconomic, industry, commodities, and geopolitical analysis. BMI launched dedicated rare earth coverage in 2025 and increasingly serves institutional investors seeking intelligence on critical minerals, supply-chain security, and geopolitical industrial competition.

Disclaimer: This analysis references statements made during Fitch Ratings APAC’s “China Perspectives” podcast and accompanying BMI analysis. Investors should independently verify forecasts, geopolitical assumptions, production estimates, and market projections.