A Pathway to USA and DRC Critical Mineral Collaboration?

Highlights

• CSIS brief argues U.S. must urgently engage with DRC’s critical minerals sector or risk a permanent strategic loss to China
• China’s long-term investments and infrastructure deals have outmaneuvered Western interests in the mineral-rich region.
• A comprehensive strategy requires interagency coordination, policy reforms, and strategic diplomatic and financial investments.

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Gracelin Baskaran’s March 2025 CSIS brief (opens in a new tab) delivers a lucid, data-rich argument for enhanced U.S. engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) critical minerals sector. Her central hypothesis is that without urgent and coordinated diplomatic, financial, and legislative reforms, the U.S. risks permanently ceding strategic ground in one of the world’s richest mineral frontiers to China. Drawing on geological data, stakeholder interviews, and recent mining investment trends, Baskaran shows how China’s long-term strategic investments—particularly the state-financed acquisition of Tenke Fungurume Mine (opens in a new tab)—have left the West dangerously outmaneuvered. She emphasizes that the U.S. must act quickly, leveraging financing tools like the Export-Import Bank of the United States  (EXIM) and Development Finance Corporation (DFC), improving geological mapping, and reforming outdated policies such as Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank (opens in a new tab). Her framing of the U.S. approach as “shaking pennies from cushions” compared to China’s billion-dollar infrastructure-for-access deals is particularly damning and illustrates the urgency of the moment.

A smart insight is Baskaran’s exploration of the cobalt export ban and Congolese frustration with China’s price manipulation strategy. Her analogy of China’s long game—flooding the market to drive prices down, then absorbing short-term losses in favor of long-term control—is compelling.  The brief’s recognition of local political dynamics, including President Tshisekedi’s pivot toward the U.S. in response to Rwandan-backed M23 aggression, is crucial. These geopolitical openings, coupled with mineral traceability gaps and artisanal mining formalization needs, offer the U.S. a unique opportunity to reenter the DRC space not only as an investor but as a standards-setter. The suggestion to elevate U.S. mineral diplomacy—such as adding a USGS attaché and Commercial Service Office in Kinshasa—seems both practical and overdue.

When Vision Meets Reality

Despite its strengths, the brief has a few notable limitations. First, the author leans heavily on the assumption that the U.S. government can quickly align its sprawling bureaucracy—State, USAID, DFC, EXIM, Commerce, Defense, and USGS—toward a single minerals strategy. Yes, the U.S., under newly elected President Donald Trump, announced the executive order (opens in a new tab) “to boost American mineral production, streamline permitting, and enhance national security.” As Rare Earth Exchanges has reported, the executive order represents a big first step, but much work is left to do for true rare earth elements and critical mineral resilience.

Could it be that the reality of the heightened level of interagency coordination the CSIS author calls for has historically been slow and politically fraught, particularly given D.C.’s polarization and inconsistent Africa policy? Does the new administration’s executive order change this sufficiently?

Second, while the brief identifies the DRC’s fragmented tax system and export volatility as obstacles, does it underplay how entrenched local corruption and patronage networks, especially within Gécamines, can, let us say, impair even the best-designed foreign initiatives?

Biases, Priorities

CSIS certainly exhibits a subtle bias in its optimistic tone regarding the U.S.’s ability to “catch up” and displace Chinese dominance. This optimism may mislead policymakers into thinking the U.S. can achieve parity without matching China’s risk tolerance, state financing capacity, or vertically integrated industrial policy. Moreover, Baskaran does not sufficiently interrogate how U.S. environmental and ESG constraints may delay project timelines, making it harder to compete with China’s no-strings-attached model.  Would we just reform 1502 of Dodd-Frank and be done with it? What does it mean to reform?  How long would that take?

Reforming Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act—mandating that U.S. publicly traded companies disclose whether their products contain conflict minerals from the DRC and surrounding regions—would require a combination of legislative, regulatory, and diplomatic steps.

In reality, reforming this Act would likely take 12 to 36 months, depending on political momentum, stakeholder alignment, and legislative bandwidth.

While an integrateddeal with the DRC offers strategic value in the global race for critical minerals—given the country’s unmatched cobalt reserves and its 2024 lead in African mineral exploration investment—framing such a partnership as the key to helping the U.S. catch up with China is overly simplistic and ignores the systemic breadth of America’s vulnerabilities.

China’s dominance stems not only from securing access to raw materials in the DRC through Belt and Road deals but from building control over the entire value chain—from mining to refining to manufacturing. The U.S., by contrast, still lacks basic refining capacity and, frankly, industrial policy coherence and faces political and social obstacles to developing its domestic resources. Again, President Trump’s executive order appears to be a start at streamlined permitting within the U.S.

The DRC remains a high-risk environment plagued by corruption, instability, and labor abuses, making it an unreliable linchpin. While improving U.S.-DRC commercial diplomacy and supporting transparency reforms is smart, it should be seen as one element in a much broader strategy that prioritizes domestic investment, recycling infrastructure, public-private innovation, and strategic coordination with allies like Australia, Canada, the EU, and South Korea.  Rare Earth Exchanges cannot overemphasize the importance of the latter collaborative networks as a fundamental prerequisite for critical mineral resilience, which is not off to a great start in the administration, with the economic nationalism ideology of the day driving tensions across traditional allies such as Canada.

The path to resilience won’t be secured through one bilateral agreement, no matter how resource-rich—it demands a whole-of-system transformation.  Of course, to be fair, the CSIS author is aware of this, with a focus on the DRC and the current opportunity there. But with finite resources and a lot going on, would this move be highest on the priority list?  Maybe.

Action Speaks Louder Than Words

The brief stands out for its comprehensive scope and urgency. It is a sharp call to action that makes clear the stakes: not just for supply chains or green tech, but for geopolitical influence in one of the most mineral-rich—and vulnerable—regions in the world.  Ms. Baskaran knows the clock is ticking, and if the U.S. doesn’t move quickly and strategically, it may find itself permanently locked out of the most consequential resource basin of the 21st century.

The question remains of all of the initiatives that must be taken: where does DRC fall in priority?