Missile Shortages Signal a Deeper Supply Chain Crisis: The Great Powers Era 2.0 in Action

Highlights

• U.S. missile inventories were significantly depleted after the 39-day Iran conflict; critical systems like Tomahawk, JASSM, Patriot, and THAAD were reduced by over half, raising concerns about readiness for future peer conflicts with China.
• Missile production constraints stem from complex supply chain dependencies, including rare-earth processing controlled by China; production can take up to four years from funding to delivery—showing that access to materials doesn’t equal control.
• The report reinforces the “Great Powers Era 2.0” thesis: military readiness now depends on supply chain sovereignty, not just battlefield capability, requiring domestic control over critical mineral processing to sustain weapons production at scale.

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A new report (opens in a new tab) by Mark F. Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, co-authored with Chris H. Park, delivers a sobering but nuanced assessment of U.S. missile inventories following the recent Iran conflict—one that directly reinforces the Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) “Great Powers Era 2.0” thesis: power now flows through supply chains, not just battlefields. The study finds that while the United States retains enough munitions to sustain the current war, it has significantly depleted critical stockpiles—particularly long-range precision strike and missile defense systems—raising concerns about readiness for future conflicts with peer competitors like China. To put all of this in perspective: the U.S. can finish today’s fight, but may be underprepared for the next one because the industrial system behind these weapons—dependent on complex materials, including rare earth elements—is too slow, too constrained, and too globally contested to replenish quickly.

Study Methods: Estimating the Invisible

Because actual missile inventories are classified, the authors relied on U.S. Department of Defense budget data, procurement records, and historical usage patterns to estimate stockpiles and wartime consumption. They modeled combat usage during the Iran conflict using operational assumptions and public disclosures, while accounting for missile shelf life and non-combat usage. This approach provides directional insight, even if exact figures remain uncertain.

Key Findings: Industrial Limits Exposed

The study identifies seven critical munitions—including Tomahawk, JASSM, Patriot, and THAAD—that were heavily consumed in just 39 days of combat, with some inventories reduced by more than half. These systems are not easily replaceable: they are complex, multi-component platforms reliant on advanced materials, precision manufacturing, and long production cycles—often taking up to four years from funding to delivery.

For REEx readers, the deeper issue is not just cost or time—it is material dependency. Many of these systems rely on rare earth elements for guidance systems, sensors, and high-performance magnets. This ties missile readiness directly to global rare earth supply chains, where China maintains dominant control over processing and refining. In short: no rare earths, no missiles.

The U.S. adapted tactically by shifting to cheaper munitions like guided bombs and drones, but these require closer engagement and increase operational risk. Meanwhile, missile defense systems—like Patriot and THAAD—have no scalable substitutes, making their depletion strategically significant.

Implications: Great Powers Era 2.0—Supply Chains Are Strategy

This study is a case study in Great Powers Era 2.0: alignment is not independence; access is not control. The U.S. may have access to materials and manufacturing partners, but it does not fully control the upstream and midstream supply chains—especially in rare earth separation and magnet production.

Missile shortages are therefore not just a defense issue—they are a supply chain sovereignty issue. The same bottlenecks seen in rare earths—particularly in processing and refining—now manifest in weapons production. Allies like Ukraine and Japan further strain the limited supply, forcing geopolitical allocation decisions.

Limitations and Controversies

The study relies on modeled estimates due to classified data, introducing uncertainty around exact inventory levels and usage rates. Assumptions regarding battlefield dynamics and allied contributions may affect conclusions. Additionally, the implicit policy stance—prioritizing current warfighting over future readiness—may be debated, particularly given long-term industrial constraints.

What Comes Next: From Weapons to Materials Strategy

The report calls for expanded missile production and development of low-cost alternatives. But from a REEx perspective, that is necessary but insufficient.

The real solution lies deeper: rebuilding domestic and allied control over critical mineral and rare earth supply chains, especially midstream processing. Without that, production targets risk becoming political aspirations rather than executable reality. In Great Powers Era 2.0, the decisive question is no longer “Who has the best weapons?” but “Who controls the materials and systems required to sustain them at scale?”

Citation: Cancian, M.F., & Park, C.H. (2026).Status of Key Munitions After the Iran Conflict. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).